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INTRODUCTION 
The Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the State of 
Utah ("Commissioner") is the chief executive officer of the Utah 
Department of Financial Institutions ("DFI"). (Utah Code Ann. § 
7-1-202 (Supp. 1993).) Among the entities over which DFI has 
jurisdiction are all banks, all savings and loans ("S&Ls"), all 
industrial loan corporations ("ILCs"), and all credit unions 
operating in the State of Utah. (Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-501 (Supp. 
1993). ) 
This jurisdiction is not absolute. Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-502 
(1988) limits the jurisdiction of DFI. Banks, S&Ls, and credit 
unions can all be chartered (authorized to do business as a bank, 
S&L, or credit union) either by a state or by a federal 
regulatory agency. The main limitation on DFI's jurisdiction is 
with respect "to business activities not wholly regulated or 
supervised by an agency or department of the United States . . 
.," which primarily means DFI for the most part does not have 
jurisdiction over federally-chartered depository institutions in 
Utah, including federally-chartered credit unions. 
Banks, S&Ls, and ILCs are corporations which are owned by 
stockholders, just like other corporations.1 Their "customers" 
are depositors or borrowers, and are generally referred to as 
1
 Some S&Ls are mutual associations that are technically 
owned by all their depositors. Most such S&Ls, however, are now 
regular stock corporations that are not owned by all their 
depositors; in any event, S&Ls have never used the terminology of 
their depositors being "members", or have spoken - t a new 
customer as "joining" the S&L. S&Ls also have not had the same 
tax advantages as credit unions, nor have they been restricted in 
who could be a depositor, i.e., no "limited field of membership". 
such. Furthermore, these entities are all subject to federal and 
state taxation on their profits. 
Unlike these other entities, credit unions have some unique 
restrictions, advantages, and terminology. A credit union is a 
non-profit corporation that is technically "owned" by its 
depositors. Its depositors are called "members," and the member 
technically doesn't deposit funds in the credit union, but rather 
purchases "shares," with each share being equivalent to $1.00.2 
When a person becomes a new member of a credit union, that person 
is said to have "joined" the credit union. 
Credit unions are exempt from Federal and state taxation on 
their profits. (12 U.S.C. § 1768, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(14)(A), and 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-34 (Supp. 1993).) Credit unions are also 
limited as to who can join a credit union. Only those persons in 
the credit union's "limited field of membership" can join the 
credit union. 
Originally, most credit union's limited fields of membership 
were associational. There was a common employer, or a common 
profession. For example, the field might be "all persons 
employed by ZCMI," or "all pipefitters." In 1981, Utah law for 
the first time allowed credit unions chartered by Utah to include 
geographical areas in their fields of membership. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 7-9-3(5) provided then (as it still does today): 
2
 A person can also purchase a fraction of a share for a 
fraction of a dollar, e.g., a deposit of $8.39 purchases 8.39 
shares in the credit union. 
2 
7-9-3• Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
• * • * * 
(5) "Limited field of membership" means persons 
belonging to a group or persons designated as eligible 
for credit union membership who: 
(a) have a similar interest, profession, 
occupation, or formal association with an identifiable 
purpose; 
(b) reside within an identifiable 
neighborhood, community, rural district, or county; 
(c) are employed by a common employer; 
(d) are employed within a defined business 
district, industrial park or shopping center; 
(e) are employed by the credit union; or 
(f) are members of the immediate family of 
persons within the above groups. 
[Emphasis added.] 
A credit union defines its field of membership in its 
bylaws. (Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-12(3) (1988).) Amendments to the 
bylaws must be approved by the Commissioner. (Utah Code Ann. § 
7-9-11 (2) (1988).) 
On September 9, 1983, David A. Kwant, DFI's Supervisor of 
Credit Unions, prepared a memorandum ("Kwant Memo") to Elaine B. 
Weis, who at that time was Commissioner. (A copy of the Kwant 
Memo is attached hereto and included herein by reference as 
Exhibit B. ) The Kwant Memo argued credit unions needed to be 
allowed to grow if they were to survive. Mr. Kwant suggested 
that credit unions be allowed to amend their bylaws to include 
all person residing within a county, and that the bylaws be able 
to name more than one county, e.g., all persons residing in Salt 
Lake County, all persons residing in Davis County, etc. (This 
policy of allowing credit unions to include in their fields of 
membership all persons residing in county A, and residing in 
county B, etc., will be referred to throughout this brief as the 
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"multi-county field of membership policy.") Of course, the 
Commissioner would first have to approve any amendments to the 
bylaws, so this would serve as a check on any misuse of this 
provision. 
On September 9, 1983, Commissioner Weis approved the Kwant 
Memo, including the policy of allowing credit unions to have a 
multi-county field of membership. Commissioner Weis noted her 
approval at the end pf the memo. 
In 1993, twelve Utah State-chartered credit unions and three 
Federally-chartered credit unions with their home offices in Utah 
incorporated Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. ("CUSC"). 
The main purpose of CUSC is to open offices which would serve as 
a "shared branch" for these credit unions, with the possibility 
that other credit unions may later be permitted also to use these 
offices as a "shared branch" for their credit unions. Members of 
any credit union authorized to use the shared branch can walk 
into the shared branch and obtain almost all of the same services 
the member could obtain at the home office or separate branch of 
the member's credit union. 
Because the idea of a "shared branch" had never before been 
introduced in Utah, G. Edward Leary, the present Commissioner 
("Commissioner Leary") decided to hold a hearing on the CUSC 
Application. The Utah Bankers Association ("UBA") filed an 
objection to the CUSC Application. UBA also appeared at the 
hearing and presented a case against granting the CUSC 
Application. UBA's main objection is that it believes the 
Commissioner is incorrect in allowing credit unions to have 
4 
multi-county branching. UBA believes a credit union may include 
in its field of membership only all persons in any one named 
county. UBA also argued CUSC could not be approved because CUSC 
is not a "branch," nor does it fit within the authorization for 
credit unions under Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-5(29) (Supp. 1993). 
On November 19, 1993, Commissioner Leary conditionally 
granted the CUSC Application. On December 17, 1993, UBA filed 
its petition with this Court for a review of Commissioner Learyfs 
order. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
UBA petitioned for review of an administrative order of the 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions. The order was entered as 
a result of proceedings under the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act (Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l, et seq. (1989 & Supp. 1993)). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this petition 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-14 and -16(1) (1989), and 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (a) (Supp. 1993). 
ISSUES 
1. Did the Commissioner of Financial Institutions misapply 
the law in approving the CUSC Application? 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-16(4)(d) (Supp. 1993); Dep't of Admin. Services v. Pub. 
Service Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983); Bevans v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah 1989). 
2. Did the Commissioner of Financial Institutions have 
adequate evidence and grounds to approve the CUSC Application? 
5 
Standard of Reviews Abuse of discretion. Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-16(4)(h) (Supp. 1993); Morton Internat'l. Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The determinative statutes are Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-1-
103(34), 7-1-208, 7-1-303, 7-1-501, 7-1-502, 7-1-706, 7-1-708, 7-
9-3(5), 7-9-5(29), 7-9-6, 7-9-11, 7-9-12, 7-9-16, 7-9-34, 7-9-47, 
and 7-16-2, all of which are included in Exhibit A to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. UBA has petitioned this Court to review 
an order of the Commissioner granting the application of CUSC to 
provide "shared branch" facilities in Utah. UBA believes the 
order is incorrect because (1) it will allow credit unions to 
continue to have multi-county fields of membership, in 
contravention of Utah law, and (2) the operations of CUSC which 
were approved are not operations in which credit unions are 
authorized to participate under Utah law. 
B. Course of Proceedings. Commissioner Leary used his 
discretion to hold a hearing on the CUSC Application. The 
hearing was held under the procedures of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l, et sea. (1989 & Supp. 
1993)). CUSC and UBA were the only parties who participated in 
the hearing, although any interested person was invited to 
participate. UBA opposed the CUSC Application. CUSC and UBA 
called witnesses and presented other evidence. CUSC and UBA 
filed memoranda supporting their positions. The Hearing Officer 
6 
wrote a memorandum opinion, as well as findings, conclusions, and 
a recommendation to the Commissioner that the CUSC Application be 
conditionally approved. 
C. Disposition in the Utah Department of Financial 
Institutions. Commissioner Leary conditionally approved the CUSC 
Application. 
D. Statement of Facts. 
1. On or about March 18, 1993, CUSC was incorporated. (R. 
17-19) CUSC is owned by fifteen credit unions with their home 
offices in Utah. Twelve of the credit unions owning shares of 
CUSC ("state-chartered credit unions") are chartered by the Utah 
Department of Financial Institutions ("DFI"), while the other 
three ("Federally-chartered credit unions") are chartered by the 
National Credit Union Administration ("NCUA"). (R. 39) 
2. On or about June 25, 1993, CUSC filed "An Application to 
Provide Service Center Services for Credit Unions in Utah" ("CUSC 
Application") (R. 1-128) with the Utah Department of Financial 
Institutions ("DFI") to allow: 
1. The operation of service centers for credit unions 
as consumer funds transfer facilities; (sic) or 
otherwise; 
2. Participation in regional or national networks for 
performing financial transactions; 
3. The acceptance and processing of loan applications for 
and on behalf of participating credit unions; and 
4. The conduct of services authorized for credit unions 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 7-9-5(29). 
(R. 2) In layman's terms, the service center is a "shared 
branch," i.e.f a member of any credit union authorized to use the 
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service center can go into the service center and receive the 
same services that a member could receive at a branch office of 
the member's own credit union. 0rf as explained in the CUSC 
Application: 
A service center offers participating credit 
unions with (sic) virtually all credit union services. 
Central to the service center is the ability to provide 
credit union services ordinarily performed by a teller 
at a credit union office. The following example of the 
completion of a transaction at a service center is 
illustrative of a service center's function. 
A member of one of the credit unions authorized 
to use the service center] enters the service center 
and "swipes'* his membership card through a card reader 
and enters a personal identification number (PIN). The 
member's membership is confirmed and validated 
electronically through an on-line communications link 
between the service center and the credit union. The 
member approaches the teller station and the teller's 
screen provides the information regarding the member's 
account(s). The member's transaction is completed. If 
checks are deposited, a printer at the teller's station 
places the credit union's endorsement and routing and 
transit number on the check. If cash is withdrawn, the 
cash is paid by the teller. With all transactions, the 
member's balances at the credit union are immediately 
updated at the credit union. 
(R. 4-5) 
3. The CUSC Application was accepted as complete by DFI on 
August 23, 1993. (R. 129) Pursuant to statute, Commissioner 
Leary referred the CUSC Application to Orla Beth Peck, Supervisor 
of Credit Unions at DFI, to "make a careful investigation of the 
facts relevant or material to such application," and then to 
"submit [her] finding and recommendations in writing to the 
commissioner." (Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-706 (1988).) 
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4. On August 24, 1993, Ms. Peck gave Commissioner Leary her 
written findings and recommendation on the CUSC Application. (R. 
129-131) Ms. Peck stated: 
I don't think there is any question that Credit 
Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. can legally operate 
as (sic) shared branch of all 15 credit unions 
participating in the CUSO [credit union service 
organization]. The question is whether it can operate 
as a Consumer Funds Transfer Facility and thereby 
legally accept transactions from members in behalf of 
credit unions in other states under a network 
arrangement. 
With respect to the four requests in the CUSC Application (set 
forth in paragraph 2 above), Ms. Peck recommended as follows: 
[Recommendation on] Request #1. [in the CUSC 
Application] I recommend that we approve the shared 
branch as a branch of all 15 credit unions and allow it 
to begin operations serving only the members of the 15 
participating credit unions. 
[Recommendation on] Request #2. I recommend we 
postpone a decision until we have had more time to 
study it. 
[Recommendation on] Request #3. I recommend that 
we approve the shared branch to accept and process loan 
applications on behalf of the participating credit 
unions. 
[Recommendation on] Request #4. I recommend we 
approve the shared branch to conduct services 
authorized pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 7-9-5(29). 
(R- 131) 
5. Because the concept of a shared branch had never before 
been introduced in Utah, Commissioner Leary decided to hold 
hearings on the CUSC Application. Commissioner Leary appointed 
Gary B. Doxey, newly-appointed Deputy Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions of the State of Utah, as the hearing officer 
("Hearing Officer"). (R. 132) 
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6. On September 3, 1993, a "Notice of Hearing on 
Application to Operate Service Centers" was mailed to all 
interested parties, including representatives of the appellants 
herein, the Utah Bankers Association ("UBA"). The notice set the 
hearing for 9:00 a.nu on October 20, 1993, and informed all 
persons that notices, written objections, and memoranda had to be 
received by DFI no later than 5:00 p.m. on October 19, 1993. 
(R.132-135) Notice of the hearing was also published in The Salt 
Lake Tribune and the Deseret News on September 8, 12 and 19, 
1993. (R. 137) 
7. On or about August 27, 1993, UBA filed an action styled 
The Utah Bankers Association v. America First Credit Union, et 
al., Case No. 930904939 CV (Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah) ("UBA v. AFCU"), in which 
UBA sought declaratory and injunctive relief . Named as 
defendants were the twelve State-chartered credit union owners of 
CUSC, CUSC itself, G. Edward Leary, as Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions, and five other State-chartered credit unions each 
of which also allegedly includes a multi-county field of 
membership. UBA requested the Court to declare invalid DFI's 
policy on multi-county fields of membership. UBA argued that if 
a credit union wants to include a geographic area in its "limited 
field of membership," and wants that geographic area to be a 
county, the credit union may select only one county in the State 
for which the credit union may say, "all persons residing within 
this county may belong to our credit union," e.g.f a credit union 
could, in its bylaws, authorize any person residing in Salt Lake 
10 
County to become a member, but the credit union's bylaws could 
not say "any person residing in Salt Lake County, Davis County, 
Weber County," etc. UBA asked the Court to declare this 
interpretation to be outside the scope of the statute, to enjoin 
the Commissioner from authorizing further multiple-county fields 
of membership for credit unions, and to enjoin credit unions with 
multiple-county fields of membership from continuing to operate 
branches in all but one selected county. UBA also asked the 
Court to declare that the Commissioner must reject the CUSC 
Application, and to enjoin CUSC and the defendant credit union 
owners of CUSC from engaging in shared branching, insofar as the 
shared branching would allow any of the defendant credit unions 
to solicit memberships, accept or pay deposits, or make loans in 
more than one Utah county in violation of the geographically 
defined field of membership limitation as interpreted by UBA. 
8. On October 19, 1993, UBA timely filed with the Hearing 
Officer "Comments of the Utah Bankers Association in Opposition 
to the Application to Operate Service Centers" (R. 138-163) and a 
"Notice of Protest by the Utah Bankers Association" (R. 164-166). 
Among the reasons UBA gave for opposing and protesting the 
hearing was that the Court proceedings in UBA v. AFCU would 
supersede any determination of the Commissioner. (R. 140-141) 
9. A one-day hearing was held on the CUSC Application on 
October 20, 1993. At the outset of the hearing, the Hearing 
Officer had all persons present identify themselves. Everyone 
present was from or representing one of three groups: (a) the 
credit unions; UBA; and DFI. (R. 176-180) 
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10. Anyone present was given the opportunity to make a 
statement or present evidence at the hearing. (R. 180, 320) 
11. During the course of the hearing, CUSC called and 
examined witnesses and presented other evidence in support of the 
CUSC Application. (R. 180-312) UBA presented its case in 
opposition to the CUSC Application, calling its own witness and 
cross examining witnesses called by CUSC. (R. 312-330) CUSC 
presented an opening statement (R. 180-197), closing argument (R. 
326-349), and a rebuttal to UBA's closing argument (R. 365-374). 
UBA presented closing argument (R. 349-365). 
12. During the course of the hearing, the Hearing Officer 
informed all parties that the question of whether a credit union 
can include in its field of membership all persons living in more 
than one county would not be an issue in the hearing. The 
Hearing Officer said this was based upon two factors: 
a. DFI's policy on multiple county branching had been in 
effect and unchallenged for ten years; and 
b. The question on the Commissioner's interpretation of 
multiple county branching was probably the chief issue 
in UBA v. AFCU. 
(R. 304, 312-314) 
13. Subsequent to the conclusion of the hearing, the 
Hearing Officer allowed the record on the hearing to remain open 
to receive memoranda from the participants in the hearing (R. 
321-325). CUSC submitted a "Hearing Memorandum and Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities" (R. 385-398) and a "Reply Memorandum of 
Applicant Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. (R. 424-431) 
UBA filed a "Supplemental Memorandum of the Utah Bankers 
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Association" (R. 399-414) and a "Reply of Utah Bankers Assoc, to 
Hearing Memorandum and Memorandum of Points and Authorities of 
Applicant" (R. 415-423) 
14. On or about November 18, 1993, the Hearing Officer 
filed with the Commissioner his "Findings, Conclusions and 
Recommendations" ("Doxey Recommendations") (R. 447-56), and his 
"Memorandum Opinion" ("Doxey Memorandum"). (R. 433-46) The 
Doxey Recommendations explicitly incorporated the Doxey 
Memorandum. (R. 447 and 433) (A copy of the Doxey 
Recommendations and a copy of the Doxey Memorandum are attached 
hereto and incorporated herein be reference as Exhibits C and D, 
respectively.) 
15. On or about November 19, 1993, Commissioner Leary 
issued his "Findings, Conclusions and Order Conditionally 
Approving" the application of CUSC ("Leary Order"). (R. 457-62) 
Explicitly incorporated into the Leary Order (R. 457) were the 
Doxey Recommendations and the Doxey Memorandum. (A copy of the 
Leary Order is attached hereto and incorporated herein be 
reference as Exhibits E.) The Leary Order approved the 
application of CUSC under the authority given to the Commissioner 
in Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-303 (1988) (R. 460), which in relevant 
part provides: 
Utah Code Ann. S 7-1-303 (1988) 
The [Commissioner [of Financial Institutions] may 
authorize institutions subject to the jurisdiction of 
the department to engage in such joint and cooperative 
actions as the [Commissioner finds will be in the 
public interest, such as, but not limited to: 
* * * * * 
(2) joint use of facilities; 
* * * * * 
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The Commissioner also found that he had no jurisdiction to deny 
the federal credit union owners of CUSC the right to use CUSC as 
a shared branch facility, and that the regulator of those three 
federal credit unionsf the National Credit Union Administration, 
has specifically authorized credit union service organizations to 
offer shared branching facilities which federal credit unions may 
use, (R. 461, para. 24) 
16. On or about December 17, 1993, UBA filed with the 
Commissioner a "Petition for Stay of Order Conditionally 
Approving Application." (R. 464-473) By agreement, CUSC was 
given the opportunity to respond to UBA's petition for a stay, 
and UBA was given the opportunity to reply to CUSC's response. 
(R. 473A) CUSC filed "Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. 
Response to the Utah Bankers Association Petition for Stay of 
Order Conditionally Approving Application" on January 10, 1994 
(R. 474-485), together with three supporting affidavits (R. 486-
499). UBA then filed its "Reply of Utah Bankers Association in 
Support of Petition for Stay" on January 24, 1994. (R. 500-507) 
On January 26, 1994, Commissioner Leary entered his "Order 
Denying Petition for Stay." (R. 508-509) 
17. On or about December 17, 1993, UBA filed with this 
Court its "Petition for Appellate Review" of the Leary Order. 
RELATED CASE 
As noted above in paragraph 7, on August 27, 1993, UBA filed 
its action in UBA v. AFCU. Commissioner Leary filed a motion to 
dismiss, with supporting memoranda. All other defendants ("CU 
Defendants") were represented by the same counsel, and the CU 
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Defendants filed a separate motion to dismiss and supporting 
memoranda. UBA filed memoranda in opposition to the defendants' 
motions to dismiss, and filed its own motion for summary 
judgment, to which Commissioner Leary and the other defendants 
filed separate memoranda in opposition. Oral argument was heard 
on all motions on November 22, 1993. 
On March 17, 1993, the Third Judicial District Court entered 
its "Memorandum Decision and Order." The Court granted the 
motions to dismiss of Commissioner Leary and the other defendants 
on the grounds UBA had no standing to bring the lawsuit. In 
addition, the Court ruled that except with respect to UBA's 
claims for injunctive relief against CUSC, UBA's suit was barred 
by the doctrine of laches and estoppel. 
A final Order was entered by the Court on April 7, 1994. As 
of the date of the filing of this brief, UBA has not appealed 
that Order. (A copy of the Court's "Memorandum Decision and 
Order" and the "Order Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary 
Judgment and Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint" are attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit F.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
UBA petitions this Court to reverse an administrative order 
of DFI granting an application of CUSC to offer a shared 
branching facility which members of CUSC's credit union owners 
can use in the same manner as those members could use a branch of 
their own individual credit unions. UBA asserts two grounds for 
reversal: (1) CUSC will further the violation of the prohibited 
multi-county field of membership policy of DFI; and (2) a shared 
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branch facility is not an activity the Commissioner has authority 
to grant to a credit union service organization like CUSC under 
Utah Code Ann- § 7-9-5(29) (Supp. 1993). 
The Leary Order was lawfully granted under Utah Code Ann. § 
7-1-303 (1988)- CUSC meets the definition of a "service 
corporation,"3 which means it is under the jurisdiction of DFI. 
While a "shared branch" is not specifically mentioned as one of 
the activities in whdch the Commissioner can authorize financial 
institutions under DFI's jurisdiction to participate, the 
language is that statute is broad enough to permit such an 
activity. 
At the hearing on the CUSC Application, sufficient evidence 
was presented to allow the Commissioner to conclude that approval 
of the CUSC Application was in the best interest of the public. 
Therefore, the Commissioner could, and did, approve the CUSC 
Application. The Commissioner did not approve the CUSC 
Application under Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-5(29) (Supp. 1993). 
As for the multi-county field of membership issue, "field of 
membership" is a consideration when looking at credit unions 
themselves. "Field of membership" — and consequently DFI's 
policy on multi-county fields of membership — does not apply to 
credit union service organizations or to credit union branches. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the multi-county field of 
membership policy did apply to the CUSC Application, the 
Commissioner could still have granted the CUSC Application. Most 
3
 Title 7, Utah Code Ann. uses the terms "service 
corporation" and "service organization" interchangeably. 
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of the credit union owners of CUSC have their home offices in 
Salt Lake County, which is the only county in which CUSC has even 
discussed offering a shared branch facility. Those credit unions 
could have applied to open branches at the CUSC location, and 
unless opening such a branch would make a credit union 
financially unsound, the Commissioner would had to have approved 
the branch. 
With respect to the multi-county field of membership issue, 
the Commissioner's interpretation is correct. There is statutory 
language which supports this interpretation. In addition, the 
Commissioner and the Supervisor of Credit Unions are charged with 
administering the law in this area. Their long-standing policy 
should be given deference by the Court, since this is a mixed 
question of law and fact. Also, the Court in UBA v. AFCU has in 
effect "blessed" this interpretation, since it dismissed UBA's 
suit in part on laches, and in part on standing, stating even if 
UBA had added a named bank as a plaintiff, it would not have 
overcome their problem on lack of standing. 
UBA already tried to have its interpretation of the multi-
county field of membership issue approved by the Court in UBA v. 
AFCU. UBA chose their forum, and they lost. The should either 
appeal that decision or else forget that claim; they should not 
be given a "second bite at the apple" by appealing the Leary 
Order to this Court. At the very least, this Court should 
determine, as did the Court in UBA v. AFCU, that UBA both lacks 
standing to pursue this issue, and is barred by the doctrines of 
laches and estoppel form pursuing it in this appeal. 
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Finally, if UBA lacked standing to pursue its suit in UBA v. 
AFCU, it lacks standing to appeal the Leary Order. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSIONER HAD THE AUTHORITY TO APPROVE THE CUSC 
Application, 
A. The Leary Order was Lawfully Granted Under the Provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. S 7-1-303 (1988K 
The Doxey Memorandum, the Doxey Recommendations, and the 
Leary Order all went to great lengths to make it clear the CUSC 
Application was being approved under the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 7-1-303 (1988). CUSC was not approved under Utah Code 
Ann. § 7-9-5(29) (Supp. 1993). Nor was CUSC approved as either a 
"branch" under Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-709 (Supp. 1993), or as an 
automatic teller machine ("ATM") or point of sale ("POS") 
terminal under Chapter 16 of Title 7, Utah Code Ann. (1988 and 
Supp. 1993). 
1. The Statutory Definitions for Approving the CUSC 
Application under Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-303 (1988) Were 
Met. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-303 (1988) in relevant part provides: 
The [C]ommissioner may authorize institutions 
subject to the jurisdiction of the [D]epartment [of 
Financial Institutions] to engage in such joint and 
cooperative actions as the [Commissioner finds will be 
in the public interest, such as, but not limited to: 
(1) mutual exchange of financial information as to 
depositors, borrowers, and other customers; 
(2) joint use of facilities; 
(3) joint operation of clearing houses and other 
facilities for payment of checks, drafts, or other 
instruments drawn on or issued by various classes of 
depository institutions; 
(4) joint participation in lending programs to 
promote the public welfare; 
(5) joint risk management services; and 
(6) joint ownership, operation, or furnishing of 
electronic funds transfer services. 
[Emphasis added.] 
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The first question the Commissioner had to address was 
whether the CUSC Application could be authorized under this 
statute. The evidence showed approval of the CUSC Application 
would clearly allow credit unions to engage in "joint and 
cooperative actions," but there was a question as to whether CUSC 
is "subject to the jurisdiction" of DFI. As the Hearing Officer 
found, Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-501 (Supp. 1993) provides in relevant 
part: 
The following persons and institutions are subject to 
the jurisdiction of the department and are subject to 
supervision and examination by the department as provided in 
this title and the rules and regulations of the department: 
* * * * * 
(3) all service corporations; 
(4) all credit unions; 
* * * * * 
"Service corporation" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-
103(33) Supp. 1993) as follows: 
(33) "Service corporation" means a corporation or other 
business entity owned or controlled by one or more 
financial institutions which is engaged or proposes to 
engage in business activities related to the business 
of financial institutions. 
As the evidence at the hearing showed, CUSC is a corporation 
"owned or controlled by one or more financial institutions," and 
CUSC will be "engaged or proposes to engage in business 
activities related to the business of financial institutions." 
CUSC thus fits the definition of a "service corporation," and 
"all service corporations" are subject to the jurisdiction of DFI 
under Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-501(3) (Supp. 1993). (R. 440-441) 
The Hearing Officer determined a "shared branch" facility 
would provide credit unions with "joint and cooperative actions" 
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and a "joint use of facilities.- He also determined that 
although Utah Code Ann- § 7-1-303 (1988) does not specifically 
mention "shared branch" facilities as one of the activities in 
which the Commissioner may authorize financial institutions to 
engage, the expansive language of the activities named in the 
statute, and the words "but not limited to" prefacing the 
specific of "joint use of facilities," gave further verification 
to the authority of "the Commissioner to authorize a "shared 
branch" facility under this statute. 
Therefore, CUSC fit the definition of an institution subject 
to the jurisdiction of DFI, and approval of its application would 
authorize credit unions to engage in joint and cooperative 
actions, including, but not necessarily limited to, joint use of 
facilities. As the definitional requirements were met, it was 
within the Commissioner's discretion to approve the CUSC 
Application if there were enough evidence to justify approval. 
2. The Commissioner Did Not Have to Rule on the CUSC 
Application under Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-5(29 ^  (Supp. 
1993), Nor Rule on CUSC as a Branch or as a Consumer 
Funds Transfer Facility. 
Although though the CUSC Application originally requested 
that it be authorized to engage in certain activities under Utah 
Code Ann. § 7-9-5(29) (Supp,. 1993), neither the Leary Order, nor 
the Doxey Recommendations, nor the Doxey Memorandum even discuss 
that section, which allows a credit union to: 
(29) participate in systems which allow the 
transfer, withdrawal, or deposit of funds of credit 
unions or credit union members by automated or 
electronic means and hold membership in entities 
established to promote and effectuate these systems, if 
the participation is not inconsistent with the law and 
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rules of the department, and if any credit union 
participating in any system notifies the department as 
provided by law; 
[Empha sis added.] 
The Leary Order, the Doxey Recommendations, and the Doxey 
Memorandum do not indicate why they did not analyze the CUSC 
Application under Utah Code Ann, § 7-9-5(29) (Supp. 1993); 
perhaps the Hearing Officer and the Commissioner saw some of the 
same problems raised by UBA in its brief (UBA Br. at 19-22). 
However, there is nothing that prevents the Commissioner from 
approving an application under a general provision that applies 
to all financial institutions under DFI's jurisdiction just 
because he could not grant that same application under a statute 
that applies only to that specific type of financial institution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-5(29) (Supp. 1993) does not say the 
activities listed thereunder are the only activities dealing with 
"by automated or electronic means" in which a credit union may 
participate, and there is no reason to assume any such 
limitations. 
In the Doxey Memorandum, the Hearing Officer discussed the 
nature of CUSC. This was necessary because the idea of a shared 
branch facility is a new concept in Utah. This is the very 
reason the Commissioner ordered a hearing on the CUSC 
Application, rather than ruling on the application without the 
benefit of receiving information in a hearing. UBA legitimately 
raised the question of the nature of CUSC. So did the Hearing 
Officer and counsel for DFI at the hearing. Counsel and 
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witnesses for CUSC freely discussed the nature of CUSC in the 
hearing. 
In the end, the Hearing Officer concluded CUSC was not a new 
class of financial institution, although even that possibility 
was considered by the Hearing Officer and explored in the 
hearing. The Hearing Officer also concluded CUSC was not an ATM 
or a POS terminal, since by definition and ATM and a POS terminal 
are not "branches." Instead, he found CUSC was much more like a 
modern branch of a financial institution, which has electronic 
devices at teller stations, loan officers' desks, and elsewhere, 
which electronic devices give virtually all officers and 
employees of the financial institution in that branch immediate 
information on the customer's accounts, and allow tellers to 
accept deposits, allow withdrawals, accept payments on loans, 
accept loan applications, and perform all the functions a 
customer of one of the credit union owners of CUSC will be able 
to do at CUSC. (R. 433-446) 
Yet CUSC itself is NOT a branch! All the CUSC Application 
requested was approval of the concept, and that is all the 
Commissioner approved, and even then, the approval was 
conditional. Approval of the CUSC Application did not 
immediately allow anyone to make deposits, or withdrawals, or 
perform any of the other functions it was authorized to perform, 
because none of the credit union owners had been granted 
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authority to open branches at the CUSC site!* Only after a 
branch application had been granted to a credit union could a 
member of that credit union begin using the facilities of that 
member's credit union's branch at the CUSC site.5 
B. The Evidence Supports the Approval of the CUSC Application 
by the Commissioner. 
During the hearing, CUSC presented evidence showing approval 
of the CUSC Application to provide a shared branching facility 
would benefit "the public." Representatives of three credit 
unions with ownership interest in CUSC, plus the President of the 
Credit Union League of Utah (the state trade association of 
credit unions in Utah), plus a representative of a credit union 
that is not an owner of, and will not be participating in, the 
shared branching facility, all gave oral testimony that the 
shared branching facility would benefit the public. (R. 197-272, 
306-308) 
The Hearing Officer also found the "CUSC presented evidence 
at the hearing to support the feasibility, public benefit, and 
A
 On February 2, 1994, Mountain America Credit Union filed 
a application for a branch at the CUSC site, and on February 16, 
the other eleven State-chartered credit union owners of CUSC each 
filed a separate application for a branch at the CUSC site. On 
March 10, 1994, Commissioner Leary entered separate "Findings, 
Conclusions and Order Approving Application" for branches at the 
CUSC site for all twelve credit unions. 
5
 CUSC has not actually yet opened at its first site. It 
is not expected it will have moved into its selected site and 
have all the equipment up an running to serve all of its credit 
union owners for some time. Thus, even after the Commissioner 
granted the applications of twelve of CUSC's credit union owners, 
the customers of those credit unions could not use — and 
currently still cannot use — the branch facilities at the CUSC 
site, but there is no legal barrier to their doing so, i.e., they 
could do so if the CUSC site were up and running. 
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the safety and soundness of its planned operation of service 
centers," and listed seventeen specific findings to bolster that 
general finding. (R. 450-453) For his part, Commissioner Leary 
not only adopted the Doxey Recommendations, but also ruled: 
25. CUSC has presented uncontroverted evidence 
that participation in service centers will enhance the 
convenience and availability of credit union services 
to credit union members. The reduction of costs 
through a cost sharing mechanism enhances the return to 
credit union members and warrants an opportunity to 
develop this concept of service delivery for Utah 
credit union members. The risks inherent in providing 
any new method of delivering services are present, but 
is mitigated by the phased, step-by-step approach of 
CUSC. In keeping with Utah's desire to be on the 
forefront of technology utilization, service centers 
present an undeniable opportunity for all financial 
institutions. Credit union service centers are in the 
best interest of the public. 
[Emphasis added.] 
(R. 461) 
Given that CUSC and the services it proposed to provide fit 
within the definitions of Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-303 (1988) by 
which the Commissioner could grant the CUSC Application, and 
given the evidence presented at the hearing that approving the 
CUSC Application would be in the public interest, the 
Commissioner properly and lawfully exercised his discretion when 
he approved the CUSC Application. 
II. THE APPROVAL OF THE CUSC Application IS NOT UNLAWFUL BECAUSE 
CREDIT UNIONS HAVE MULTI-COUNTY FIELDS OF MEMBERSHIP 
UBA argues the Commissioner could not lawfully approve the 
CUSC Application because CUSC will provide a branch for some of 
CUSC's credit union owners which have multi-county fields of 
membership. UBA's argument can be summarized as follows: Utah 
Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5) allows a field of membership to include all 
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persons residing within a county, not counties. Many of the 
credit union owners of CUSC have provisions in their bylaws 
allowing for multi-county fields of membership. The shared 
branching facility of CUSC would allow these credit unions to 
continue their unlawful practice by giving them another outlet in 
a multi-county from which to solicit and serve members. In light 
of this, the Commissioner cannot approve the CUSC Application. 
UBA's analysis is incorrect, because DFI's policy on multi-
county fields of membership is correct. Furthermore, the policy 
is inapplicable to the Commissioner's consideration of the CUSC 
Application, as explained in the points below. 
A. The Allegations of UBA with Respect to Multi-County Fields 
of Membership for the Credit Union Owners of CUSC Are 
Irrelevant to the Approval of CUSC. 
As noted above, at the beginning of the hearing on the CUSC 
Application, the Hearing Officer announced the question of multi-
county fields of membership would not be an issue in the hearing. 
The Hearing Officer explained DFI had had a long-standing policy 
in place on that matter, which policy had not been challenged 
during the ten years it had been in existence. In addition, all 
were aware of the lawsuit UBA had brought in UBA v AFCU, which 
was pending in the Third Judicial District Court. (R. 304) The 
Hearing Officer made similar findings in the Doxey Memorandum and 
the Doxey Recommendations. (R. 445 and 455) The Commissioner so 
found by adopting into the Leary Order the Doxey Memorandum and 
the Doxey Recommendations, and also through a separate finding. 
(R. 460) 
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However, UBA's challenge to DFIfs policy on multi-county 
fields of membership is irrelevant to the CUSC Application 
anyway. 
1. Field of Membership Relates to Membership in a Credit 
Union, and not to Credit Union Service Organizations. 
CUSC is not a credit union, but is rather a credit union 
service corporation. Therefore, if UBA's argument regarding 
multi-county fields of membership has any efficacy, it is with 
respect to the individual credit unions, rather than with CUSC 
and the CUSC Application. As noted above, the approval of the 
CUSC Application did not create any new branches for any credit 
unions. 
2. Field of Membership Relates to Membership in a Credit 
Union, and not to Branches of a Credit Union. 
UBA's own language in its brief shows the irrelevancy of the 
field of membership argument with respect to branching. UBA 
states: 
A credit union with the most expansive, one county 
field of membership, for example, the residents of 
Davis County, could certainly have branch offices 
throughout Davis County. And it may be appropriate for 
that credit union to have a branch in downtown Salt 
Lake City to provide services for Davis County 
residents who work in Salt Lake City. However, it 
would be improper for the credit union to claim a 
branch office in Utah County given the remote 
relationship between that county and the Davis County 
field of membership. 
(UBA Br. at 14-15. ) 
Thus, UBA admits the credit union in its example could place 
a branch in another county to serve its members. UBA then 
asserts this credit union could not establish a branch in Utah 
County. However, UBA gives no authority as to why the credit 
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union in this example could branch into Salt Lake County, but 
could not branch into Utah County. The law, in fact, refutes 
this position. 
The branch application statute in Utah — which applies 
equally to credit unions and banks — provides as follows: 
7-1-708* Branches - Application and procedure for 
approval. 
(1) Except for classes of financial institutions 
the commissioner may designate by rule, any Utah 
depository institution or foreign depository 
institution authorized to do business in this state may 
establish one or more branches, subject to the prior 
approval of the commissioner. 
(2) Approval of the commissioner may be obtained 
by filing an application with the commissioner in the 
form the commissioner prescribes. The application shall 
state: 
(a) the proposed location of the branch; 
(b) the date on which the applicant expects 
the branch to begin operations; 
(c) the estimated annual expense to operate 
it; and 
(d) any other information required by the 
department to enable it to assess the applicant's 
ability to open and operate the branch. 
(3) The commissioner shall approve or disapprove 
the application within 30 days after it is accepted as 
complete. If the commissioner does not approve or 
disapprove an application within 30 days after it is 
accepted as complete, it is considered approved. 
* * * * * 
Under this statute, the Commissioner can really only reject 
a branch application if he determines the granting of a branch 
might cause the financial institution to be in an unsound 
financial condition. If the financial institution can show the 
branch will not put the financial institution into an unsound 
financial condition, the Commissioner is virtually required to 
approve the branch. Even if the financial institution expects 
the branch will not lose money, the Commissioner will likely 
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approve the branch, so long as the financial condition of the 
financial institution itself will not be impaired by the 
Commissioner's approving the new branch. Therefore, if the 
credit union in UBA's example could show that a branch in Utah 
County would not put the credit union into an unsafe financial 
condition, the Commissioner would have to approve the branch, 
even if the credit union didn't have many — or any — members/ 
depositors in Utah County. 
If a credit union owner of CUSC can show the establishment 
of the branch at the CUSC site will not cause the credit union to 
become unsound financially, the Commissioner can, and will, grant 
the application, whether CUSC is operating at that location or 
not. By the same token, if the credit union applied for a branch 
at the CUSC site, or elsewhere, and the establishment of that 
branch would cause the credit union to be in an unsound financial 
condition, the Commissioner would deny that application. 
After the Commissioner approved the CUSC Application, the 
twelve state-chartered credit union owners of CUSC applied 
separately for branches at the CUSC site. Evaluating each 
application separately, and evaluating each application for a 
branch at the CUSC site just as he would an application at any 
other site, in or out of Salt Lake County, the Commissioner 
separately approved each application. Field of membership simply 
does not enter into the branch application process for credit 
unions, just as location of current depositors of a bank is 
irrelevant to whether the Commissioner will approve a new branch 
for a bank. 
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3. Even if Field of Membership Related to Credit Union 
Branches. Field of Membership Does Not Relate to Credit 
Union Service Organizations. 
CUSC is a credit union service organization ("CUSO"). There 
are no branching requirements for a CUSO, nor does "field of 
membership" relate to CUSOs. Therefore, even if "field of 
membership" related to branches of a credit union, it would have 
been inappropriate for the Commissioner to have considered the 
multi-county field of membership policy with respect to the CUSC 
Application, because CUSOs are not subject to field of membership 
restrictions, nor to the branching requirements of the Financial 
Institutions Act (Title 7, Utah Code Ann.). 
4. Even if Field of Membership was Applicable to the CUSC 
Application, the Commissioner Would Still Have Had 
Solid Grounds for Approving the CUSC Application. 
In their brief, UBA lists as owners of CUSC eight credit 
unions which UBA asserts have multi-county fields of membership. 
Those credit unions are: Cypress Credit Union; Jordan Credit 
Union; MetroWest Credit Union; Salt Lake City Credit Union; 
Granite Credit Union; Transwest Credit Union; Mountain America 
Credit Union; and Hercules Credit Union. (UBA Br. at 5.) 
Each of the eight credit unions named by UBA, however, has 
its home office in Salt Lake County. At the time the CUSC 
Application was filed, CUSC was considering opening its first 
office in Salt Lake County, and no other offices were, or are 
currently, under consideration. With their home offices located 
in Salt Lake County, these eight credit unions probably have most 
of their members residing in Salt Lake County. Opening a branch 
of each credit union in the county in which each has its home 
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office would not have been hard to justify, given the proposed 
location and the benefits to credit union members that were 
testified to at the hearing. If the field of membership 
limitation applied to CUSC, the fact that the home offices of the 
eight credit unions named by UBA in its brief are located in the 
county in which CUSC proposes to put its first office — and the 
only location discussed by CUSC thus far — would certainly give 
the Commissioner grounds to approve the CUSC Application. This 
would be true even if UBA's interpretation of Utah Code Ann- § 7-
9-3(5) (1989) were correct, and those eight credit unions had to 
limit their fields of membership on a county basis to only those 
persons residing in one named county, and even if they all 
selected a county other than Salt Lake County! If a credit union 
has members in Salt Lake County, it can open a branch to serve 
those members, no matter how few, if the credit union's board of 
directors approves the branch, and the Commissioner finds opening 
of the branch will not cause the credit union to be in an 
unsound financial condition. 
B. The Commissioner's Interpretation of the Multi-County Fields 
of Membership is Correct 
Assuming the multi-county field of membership issue is 
relevant to the CUSC Application, this Court should still affirm 
the Commissioner's approval of the CUSC Application, because the 
Commissioner's interpretation on this issue is correct. 
The duties and responsibilities of the Supervisor of Credit 
Unions are set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-208 (1988), which, 
in relevant part, reads: 
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7-1-208. Supervisor of credit unions - Designation of 
examiner as - Qualifications - Responsibilities - Bond. 
(1) The commissioner shall designate an examiner as 
supervisor of credit unions who shall be a citizen of the 
United States and shall have sufficient training and 
experience in the business of credit unions or as an 
employee of a state or federal agency supervising credit 
unions to demonstrate his qualifications and fitness to 
perform the duties of his office. 
(2) The supervisor of credit unions is responsible, 
subject to the direction and control of the commissioner, 
for the general supervision and examination of all credit 
unions subject to the jurisdiction of the department and 
other institutions assigned to him by the commissioner. 
He shall assist and advise the commissioner in the 
execution of the laws of this state relating to all such 
institutions, and shall perform other duties prescribed 
in this title or assigned to him by the commissioner. 
[Emphasis added.] 
When Mr. Kwant wrote the Kwant Memorandum, he was clearly 
exercising the statutory and assigned duties of his office to 
advise Commissioner Weis of how Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5) should 
be interpreted for the proper regulation of credit unions. 
Commissioner Weis then exercised her authority and the duties of 
her office also to make such interpretations, and approved Mr. 
Kwant's recommendations. The Kwant Memorandum itself indicates 
Mr. Kwant had carefully considered such matters as the lifting by 
the Legislature of restraints on branching by financial 
institutions in the State, and the need for credit unions to 
grow. In addition, though, the following points illustrate why 
Mr. Kwant's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5) was not 
incorrect. 
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1. Statutory Support. 
Title 68, Utah Code Ann., is titled "Statutes," and Chapter 
3 therein is titled "Construction." Section 12 of Chapter 3 
reads as follows: 
68-3-12. Rules of construction. 
(1) In the construction of these statutes, the 
following general rules shall be observed, unless such 
construction would be inconsistent with the manifest 
intent of the Legislature or repugnant to the context 
of the statute: 
(a) The singular number includes the plural, and 
the plural the singular. 
* * * * * 
The interpretation given to Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5) in the 
Kwant Memorandum, allowing credit unions to include in fields of 
membership all persons living in "counties," rather than just all 
persons living in the one "county" in which a credit union has 
its main office, is certainly not "inconsistent with the manifest 
intent of the Legislature or repugnant to the context of" Utah 
Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5). Indeed, when one looks at the broad array 
of categories in Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3, which a credit union may 
use to define its field of membership, there is no reason to 
suppose the Legislature intended the word "county" to limit 
geographical fields of membership to only one county. 
Under the various subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3, a 
credit union could include in its field of membership anyone 
employed by a governmental agency, any school teachers, any 
firefighters, or any person involved in law enforcement. It is 
reasonable to assume persons fitting in each of those categories 
live in each county in the State. If a credit union is willing 
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to try to serve all government employees from San Juan County to 
Box Elder County, and from Washington County to Daggett County, 
which it clearly could lawfully do under subsection (a) of Utah 
Code Ann, § 7-9-3(5), there is no reason to read "county" in 
subsection (b) of that section as limiting membership to only the 
county in which a credit union has its main office. 
2
* DFI is Entitled to have the Court Give Judicial 
Deference to DFI's Interpretation of the Statutes it is 
Charged with Administering. 
The Commissioner and DFI are charged with supervising and 
regulating the activities of banks, savings and loan 
associations, credit unions, industrial loan corporations, and 
other related entities. (Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-501 (Supp. 1993).) 
Chapter 1 of Title 7, Utah Code Ann., provides the general powers 
the Commissioner has to carry out these responsibilities. Even a 
cursory glance at those powers — especially those in Utah Code 
Ann. § 7-1-301 — shows the broad discretion and great powers 
given to the Commissioner to carry out those responsibilities. 
Chapter 2 of Title 7 deals with supervisory actions, including 
the taking of possession of a financial institution. Again, the 
Commissioner exercises great powers and discretion in this area; 
the Commissioner can take possession of a financial institution 
without court approval, as long as the requisite findings are 
made, and "within a reasonable time" after taking possession, the 
Commissioner institutes court action. (Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-2-1 
and -2.) While in possession, the Commissioner can recommend 
plans of liquidation, reorganization, or rehabilitation, and the 
reviewing Court cannot overturn the Commissioner's determinations 
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unless they are found to be arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or 
contrary to law. (Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-2(4) and -12(1).) 
Chapter 3 relates to the regulation of banks, Chapter 5 to the 
regulation of "trust business," Chapter 7 to savings and loan 
associations, Chapter 8 to industrial loan corporations, and 
Chapter 9 to credit unions. 
With all these great discretionary powers in so many areas, 
the Commissioner and DFI employees — and especially a supervisor 
of a particular class of financial institutions — must have 
experience and expertise in administering these laws. In putting 
together his memorandum, Mr. Kwant used that expertise to give a 
reasonable interpretation to Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5), and 
Commissioner Weis used her expertise when she approved the Kwant 
Memorandum. 
The Kwant Memorandum was a logical outgrowth of the changes 
which had taken place with respect to branching in Utah. Prior 
to the July 1, 1981 effective date of the Financial Institutions 
Act of 1981 (Title 7, Utah Code Ann.) ("1981 Act"), branching was 
limited in the State. The annotations to former Utah Code Ann. § 
7-3-6 (1971) (the law prior to enactment of the 1981 Act) 
indicate banks were prohibited from branching prior to 1933. 
From then until enactment of the 1981 Act, banks could establish 
branches, but basically only in cities of the first class or in 
unincorporated parts of counties in which were located a city of 
the first class. The 1981 Act authorized banks to establish 
branches basically anywhere a bank could show a need. (Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 7-3-4 and -5 (1981).) On the other hand, even under the 
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1981 Act, the only statutory requirement for a credit union to 
establish a branch was that its board of directors authorize the 
branch, and notification of the establishment of the branch be 
given to the Commissioner. Then, in the 1983 General Session of 
the Legislature, Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-708 was amended to read 
approximately as it does now. As noted above in the discussion 
under paragraph II.A.2., under this statute, a financial 
institution of any class may now establish a branch in any 
location, unless the Commissioner finds the chances for success 
of the branch is unlikely, or establishment of the branch would 
severely impair the financial condition of the financial 
institution, or the financial institution's management has not 
demonstrated an ability to supervise a banking operation. Thus, 
with the liberalization of the branching laws by the Legislature 
in early 1983, it was not a great stretch of logic for the 
Supervisor of Credit Unions, and the Commissioner, to interpret 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5) as they did. 
Furthermore, not only has this interpretation been in effect 
for now over ten years, but it has received the approval of three 
different Commissioners: Elaine B. Weis (Commissioner from May of 
1981 to April of 1987); George Sutton (Commissioner from April of 
1987 to May of 1992); and G. Edward Leary (Commissioner from June 
199 2 to the present). Nothing has apparently ever come to the 
attention of any of these Commissioners to make him or her 
believe their interpretation was incorrect. 
In Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 
P.2d 664 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court embarked on a rather 
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extensive review of the standard of review courts should use in 
reviewing decisions by an administrative agency, and what 
deference, if any, a court should pay to the agency's 
determination. The Court stated: 
In Hurley v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission [767 P. 2d 524 (Utah 1988)], this court 
attempted to clarify the distinction between cases 
requiring deference to agency decisions and cases which 
would be reviewed using a correction of error standard. 
In distinguishing the two standards, we noted that agency 
decisions which are granted a more deferential review are 
often mixed questions of law and fact, which require 
application of specific technical fact situations to the 
statutes which an agency is empowered to administer. 
These are the types of decisions and applications in 
which the agency's special expertise puts it in a better 
position than an appellate court to evaluate the 
circumstances of the case in light of the agency mission. 
In contrast, decisions involving statutory 
interpretation, issues of basic legislative intent, or 
construction of ordinary terms in the organic statute of 
an agency involve areas in which an appellate court is as 
well suited to decide the legal questions as is the 
agency. In cases where the basic question is what does 
the law require? the standard is a correction of error 
standard. 
[811 P.2d at 668; footnotes omitted.] 
It would be hard to find an area in which an administrative 
agency exercises more discretion than in the regulation of 
financial institutions. As illustrated above, the Commissioner 
must make determinations affecting virtually everything a 
financial institution under DFI's jurisdiction does. This goes 
to the question of branches and fields of membership for credit 
unions. The Commissioner respectfully submits that if ever there 
were a situation where, at the very least, a finding of fact is 
mixed with an interpretation of law — and therefore, under 
Hurley (as cited in Savage Brothers, Inc.1, the Court should give 
deference to the determination by the Commissioner — this is 
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such a case. The Commissioner emphasizes a credit union may not 
on its own amend its bylaws to include in its field of membership 
person living within a county; rather, the bylaws must be 
submitted to the Commissioner, and the Commissioner must 
determine the expansion of the credit union's field of membership 
will not adversely impact the credit union. Only then will the 
amendment become effective, and the credit union's field of 
membership will be expanded. 
3. The Third Judicial District Court Dismissed UBA's 
Lawsuit Which Explicitly Challenged the Commissioner's 
Interpretation of the Multi-County Field of Membership. 
UBA v. AFCU dealt with only one issue — the Commissioner's 
position on multi-county fields of membership. The motions to 
dismiss filed by the Commissioner and by the CU Defendants were 
granted by the Third Judicial District Court for lack of standing 
and laches. 
While it is true the motions were granted for lack of 
standing, and the dismissal with respect to laches did not apply 
to UBA's challenge to CUSC, laches did apply to the challenge to 
the Commissioner's position on multi-county fields of membership. 
It is likely impossible under the rules of Appellate Procedure to 
bring before this Court all of the arguments and evidence 
presented to the Court in UBA v. AFCU/ when that evidence was not 
presented, and those arguments were not made, in the hearing on 
the CUSC Application. Furthermore, since the Court in UBA v. 
AFCU did not rule on the merits of the case, the relevancy of the 
arguments might also be questioned. 
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The Commissioner does believe, though, that for the purposes 
of the instant appeal, this Court should take note of the 
dismissal of UBA v. AFCU, and of the central issue in that 
lawsuit• At the hearing on the CUSC Application, the Hearing 
Officer made it plain no evidence or arguments on the multi-
county fields of membership would be heard at the hearing, and 
none would be considered by either him in his recommendations to 
the Commissioner, or by the Commissioner in his ruling on the 
CUSC Application. As the Hearing Officer informed everyone 
present, no evidence would be heard on that issue because (1) it 
was being litigated at that very time, and (2) DFI's policy had 
been in effect for ten years, and the Commissioner did not feel 
compelled to change DFI's position until a court of law told DFI 
its interpretation was incorrect. Obviously, the Commissioner 
expected the Court in UBA v. AFCU would either ratify the 
Commissioner's position, invalidate that position, or modify it 
in some manner. Thus there was no need for the Hearing Officer 
to conduct a mini-court on the issue! Such an effort would have 
been a waste of time and effort on the part of all parties. 
The Court in UBA v. AFCU has now ruled, and its ruling did 
not tell the Commissioner his interpretation on multi-county 
fields of membership was incorrect. Given the circumstances, and 
the parallel running of the hearing on the CUSC Application and 
the issue in UBA v. AFCU, this Court should give further 
deference to the Commissioner's position on multi-county fields 
of membership: since the Court in UBA v. AFCU did not overturn 
DFI's position on multi-county fields of membership, and since 
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the Commissioner said in light of the UBA v. AFCU lawsuit, DFI 
would only change its position if directed to do so by a court, 
this Court should give deference to DFI's position on this issue. 
The points made in under paragraph II.A, and B. above should 
be sufficient for the Court to uphold the Leary Order, However, 
in the event the Court wishes further support, the following 
points on standing, laches and estoppel are offered, 
C. UBA Lacks Standing to Object to the Commissioner's Position 
on Multi-County Fields of Membership in this Appeal, 
The following is basically a restatement of the arguments on 
standing the Commissioner made in UBA v. AFCU, The opinion of 
the Third Judicial District Court speaks for itself, and which of 
these arguments that Court may have adopted. While none of these 
arguments were made at the hearing on the CUSC Application (for 
the reasons explained above), it seems only fair to make them 
here, since UBA has raised the issue in its brief. (UBA Br. at 
11-19) UBA likely could have been heard on this issue in the 
hearing on the CUSC Application. UBA chose instead to challenge 
the Commissioner's position on multi-county branching in the 
District Court, where it lost for lack of standing. Since UBA 
now wants a "second bite at the apple," even before it has 
decided whether it is going to appeal the decision in UBA v. 
AFCU, the Commissioner believes it to be only fair for the 
Commissioner to raise before this Court the points he raised 
before the Court in UBA v. AFCU regarding standing. When the 
hearing was held on the CUSC Application, a number of memoranda 
had already been filed in UBA v. AFCU. The Commissioner was 
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aware of the lawsuit, and, in the interests of the parties time 
and expense, deferred having the issue presented in the hearing 
on the CUSC Application• The Commissioner was willing to let the 
Court in UBA v. AFCU determine the issue, and believes that that 
having been done, UBA should accept that decision or appeal it, 
but shouldn't get a second chance to present the issue in this 
appeal. 
The fundamental requirement for standing, under Utah law, is 
the plaintiff must have suffered, or will suffer, a tangible 
injury. Specifically, the "plaintiff must be able to show that 
he has suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives him 
a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute." (Terracor 
v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 
19 86) , quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) . ) 
In and of itself, UBA simply has no standing to ask this 
Court to review the Leary Order. UBA is a trade association, 
whose membership consists of thirty-six commercial banks which 
are authorized to do business in the State of Utah. UBA had 
every right to appear at the hearing on the CUSC Application; the 
Commissioner specifically requested that notice of the hearing be 
mailed to UBA, and he encouraged UBA's participation and input. 
At the hearing, counsel for CUSC even objected to UBA's comments 
and participation for lack of standing, but the Hearing Officer 
overruled the objection, stating the Commissioner wanted input 
from all interested persons so as to give him the best 
information possible when making his decision on the CUSC 
Application. 
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UBA itself, however, is not a depository institution, UBA 
itself has lost no members or customers to CUSC or to any of the 
credit union owners of CUSC because of DFI's position on multi-
county fields of membership. Nor is UBA threatened with losing 
any of its members or customers if credit unions continue to have 
multi-county fields of membership. 
Under Utah law, there are two exceptions to the injury in 
fact requirement. First, there is an exception to the injury in 
fact requirement where no one else besides a plaintiff — or in 
this case, perhaps, the petitioner — has a greater interest in 
the issues and the issues are unlikely to be raised unless 
brought by the plaintiff or petitioner. 
In UBA v. AFCU, UBA asserted its member banks had been 
injured by the Commissioner's policy on multi-county fields of 
membership. However, none of those banks ever joined UBA as a 
named plaintiff in that suit. Furthermore, although its doubtful 
anyone likes spending money on legal fees, it is safe to assume 
the banks UBA asserted were injured by the Commissioner' multi-
county field of membership policy were involved in litigation 
every day, both as plaintiffs and as defendants, i.e., these 
banks knew how to bring, and were capable of funding, a lawsuit 
such as UBA v. AFCU. Thus, this first exception did not apply. 
The second area in which courts will make an exception in 
cases in which the issues are unique and of great public 
interest. (See Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, 
716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986). See also Jenkins v. Finlinson, 
607 P.2d 289, 290 (Utah 1980), and Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 
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442, 443 (Utah 1978) •) The issues in those cases involved, 
respectively, the failure by a State agency to follow its own 
procedures, the right of members of the Utah State Bar to serve 
in the State Legislature, and the right of public school teachers 
to serve in the State Legislature. In none of even those cases, 
though, was it held the plaintiff had standing to bring the 
respective suits, and, the Commissioner submits, with all due 
respect, the issue in UBA v. AFCU did not rise anywhere near to 
the level of the "great public interest" of the issues in 
Terracor or Jenkins v. Finlinson or Jenkins v. State. Thus this 
second exception did not benefit UBA either, and UBA by itself 
did not have standing to bring that suit, nor does it have 
standing to bring this appeal. 
UBA, however, said it brought the suit not on its own 
behalf, but on behalf of its member banks. When an association 
seeks to brings suit on behalf of its members, it must meet 
additional standing requirements in addition to that of the 
general standard. Besides demonstrating its members have 
suffered injury, the association must also show the participation 
of the individual members of the association is not indispensable 
to the lawsuit. (Society of Prof. Journalists v. Bullock, 743 
P.2d 1166, 1175 (Utah 1987). See also Ferguson Police Officers 
v. City of Ferguson, 670 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Miss. App. 1984).) In 
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addition, the association must show the interests which it seeks 
to protect are relevant to the organization's purpose.6 
Under the criteria set forth above, UBA failed to meet any 
of the requirements necessary for standing in UBA v. AFCU to 
challenge the implementation of the shared branching facility. 
Specifically: 
1. Specific Injury Requirement 
(a) The individual members of UBA have suffered no actual 
or potential injury. At best, UBA's assertion its members will 
lose business is merely hypothetical and unlikely to actually 
occur. See, e.g., York v. Unqualified Washington County, 714 
P.2d 679, 680 (Utah 1986); Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County 
Commission, 624 P.2d 1138, 1145-46 (Utah 1981); Baird v. State, 
574 P.2d 713, 715-17 (Utah 1978). See also Common Cause v. 
Department of Energy, 702 F.2d 245, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
The Commissioner and DFI supervise four classes of 
depository institutions in Utah: banks; savings and loan 
associations; credit unions; and industrial loan companies. Each 
class has certain privileges not enjoyed by any other class. 
Each class also has certain restrictions not placed on any other 
class. 
Even a cursory glance at the powers and responsibilities of 
the Commissioner and DFI, as shown primarily in Chapter 1 of 
6
 While this requirement has not been explicitly adopted by 
the Utah Supreme Court, it nevertheless is a requirement for 
standing under federal law, and the Utah Supreme Court has 
suggested it might be a requirement for standing under Utah law, 
as well. See Society of Prof. Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 
1166, 1175, fn. 10 (Utah 1987). 
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Title 7, Utah Code Ann., will show the difficult task the 
Commissioner and DFI must undertake in balancing the many 
interests they must consider while regulating these classes. 
Perhaps these interests are best summed up in Utah Code Ann. § 7-
1-301(4) (1988), which provides: 
7-1-301. Powers and duties of commissioner as to 
financial institutions - Rules to be promulgated. 
In addition to the powers, duties, and 
responsibilities specified in this title, the 
commissioner has all the functions, powers, duties, and 
responsibilities with respect to institutions, persons, 
or businesses subject to the jurisdiction of the 
department contained in this article. The commissioner 
may adopt and issue rules consistent with the purposes 
and provisions of this title, and may revise, amend, or 
repeal them: 
* * * * * 
(4) to safeguard the interest of shareholders, 
members, depositors, and other customers of 
institutions and other persons subject to the 
jurisdiction of the department; 
* * * * * 
In the times in which we live, a financial institution which 
is not growing will likely experience problems, and ultimately 
may cease to exist. Competition in all areas is a reality. 
There is competition between financial institutions of the same 
class, and there is competition between financial institutions of 
different classes. Perhaps the main competition for all 
financial institutions in this day, however, comes not from 
competitors within the same class, or even from financial 
institutions in other classes, but rather from non-financial 
institutions. For example: insurance companies offer products 
such as universal life policies; securities brokerages will help 
companies finance needs directly through investors, rather than 
borrowing from a financial institution; automobile companies 
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solicit people in every state to obtain the credit card they 
issue; mutual funds will often provide a higher rate of return on 
investments; and money market funds can also offer higher rates 
of investments while allowing customers access to their funds 
through the equivalent of checking accounts. Thus, each 
financial institutions faces competition for its customers, and 
its business, from within its own class, from other financial 
institutions, and from non-financial institutions, as well. 
Given this scenario, it is unlikely even any of UBA's member 
banks could show direct injury resulting from a credit union's 
being able to include in its field of membership all persons 
living in county other than the county in which the credit union 
has its home office. 
(b) Even if a UBA member bank could show it had lost 
business due to the Commissioner's interpretation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 7-9-3(5), a judicial decision to prohibit that 
interpretation is unlikely to redress the bank's injury because 
credit unions will find alternate ways to do business throughout 
every area in Utah. Again, there would be nothing to prevent a 
credit union from amending its bylaws to include persons of a 
certain profession who might live in each of the counties, or to 
prevent one credit union in each county from organizing and 
including all person residing in each county. Acquisitions and 
mergers would likely occur, and the acquiring credit union would 
then include in its field of membership those persons who had 
been eligible for membership in the acquired credit union. Since 
even were the Court were to grant UBA the relief it seeks in this 
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action, the alleged injuries would not be remedied, the banks 
would not have standing to bring this appeal. See e.g. Slama v. 
Attorney General, 428 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Mass, 1981). 
(c) UBA's attempt to attack the Commissioner's position on 
multi-county fields of membership is inappropriate, because the 
purpose of that statute is to regulate membership in credit 
unions, and not to preserve business for banks. See, e.g., 
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 25 
L.Ed 184, 188 (U.S. 1970) . 
2. Necessity of Individual Participation 
Even if the individual UBA member banks themselves would 
have standing to bring this appeal, it is inappropriate for UBA 
to appeal on its own, because the alleged injury to UBA's member 
banks is so hypothetical that at least one bank would have to be 
a party to the appeal to prove how it would be injured allowing 
CUSC to offer a shared branching facility. See Society of Prof. 
Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1175 (Utah 1987). 
3. Relevancy of Suit to UBA's Purpose 
Finally, it is inappropriate for the UBA to bring this suit 
because prohibiting construction of the shared branching facility 
is irrelevant to the UBA's purpose. The UBA's purpose is to 
promote the interests of its member banks. While bringing this 
action might arguably assist the UBA's member banks by removing 
one mode of competition by one group of competitors, removing 
competition and competitors is not one of UBA's purposes. See 
Society of Prof. Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1175 
(Utah 1987). 
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In short, UBA, in and of itself, lacks standing to bring 
this appeal. The Commissioner also submits none of UBA's member 
banks have standing to bring this appeal either; in fact, the 
Court in UBA v. AFCU determined that even bringing in a named 
bank would not have cured the problem with standing for UBA or 
any bank that might be added as a plaintiff. 
As noted above, the Commissioner sought participation by any 
interested person in the hearing on the CUSC Application. The 
Commissioner appreciated the participation by UBA, and the points 
they brought out in the hearing. Nonetheless, accepting an 
invitation to participate, and participating, in an 
administrative hearing, such as this, does not necessarily mean a 
party would have standing to participate in the hearing, or that 
the party would have standing to lodge an appeal from a ruling by 
the administrative body that was unfavorable to the participant. 
Such is the case here; UBA's participation in the hearing was 
solicited and welcome, but UBA lacks standing to appeal the Leary 
Order. 
D. UBA's Challenge to the Commissioner's Position on Multi-
County Fields of Membership is Barred by Laches and Estoppel 
The interpretation of "limited field of membership" relating 
to a "county" in Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5) was approved by 
Commissioner Weis on September 9, 1983. The Commissioner and DFI 
have made no secret of this interpretation, and credit unions 
have been adding to their "limited fields of membership" the 
residents of more than one county almost since the interpretation 
was approved. UBA and its member banks have been aware of this 
interpretation for nearly ten (10) years; not only have they at 
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least tacitly condoned this interpretation, they have actually 
encouraged it and made it possible in some instances. 
In Leaver v. Gross, 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court held laches is contingent upon the establishment of 
two elements: (1) the lack of diligence on the part of the 
plaintiff; and (2) an injury to the Defendant owing to such lack 
of diligence. (610 P.2d at 1264.) Moreover, this same Court 
held in Papanikolas Brothers Enter, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center 
Assoc., 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975) that: 
Laches is not mere delay, but delay that works a 
disadvantage to another. To constitute laches, two 
elements must be established: (1) The lack of diligence 
on the part of plaintiff; (2) An injury to defendant 
owing to such lack of diligence. Although lapse of time 
is an essential part of laches, the length of time must 
depend on the circumstances of each case, for the 
propriety of refusing a claim is equally predicated upon 
the gravity of the prejudice suffered by defendant and 
the length of plaintiff's delay. 
Id. at 1260 (footnote omitted). 
In the instant matter, if Commissioner Weis' interpretation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5) was erroneous, as asserted by UBA, 
since UBA and its member banks have had knowledge of this 
interpretation for nearly ten years, there has been a lack of 
diligence and/or unexplained delay in UBA's assertion of its 
position. 
Just as importantly, UBA's lack of diligence in asserting 
their claims has injured the credit unions which are regulated by 
DFI. Those credit unions have expended time and money, and built 
or acquired facilities, to obtain members in counties beyond the 
county in which the credit unions have their home office. If the 
allegations UBA raises in its Complaint had been made when UBA 
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and its member banks first became aware of this interpretation, 
and the interpretation had been determined to be erroneous, most * 
of these credit unions would have been spared a great deal of 
expense. At this late date, not only would the credit unions be 
harmed, but their members would also be harmed if the credit 
unions were now to be forced to jettison branches and members in 
these counties. 
Moreover, lacheg effectuates a waiver of the claim. "The 
defense of laches is a form of waiver, or if not strictly waiver, 
conduct of the type which equity will deem sufficient to bar 
application of a remedy otherwise available." Packarski v. 
Smith, 147 A.2d 176 (Del. Ch. 1958). 
UBA's delay in asserting the allegations in its Complaint 
constitutes a waiver of its right to make those allegations and 
bring this suit. In Hoffa v. Hough, 30 A.2d 761 (Md. 1943), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland held, "Equity will not aid a 
claimant who has slept on his right for an unreasonable and 
unexplained length of time, thereby suffering his claim to become 
stale and causing prejudice to an adverse party, such manifest 
neglect constituting an implied waiver." Id. at 763 1 
(emphasis added). 
For the same reasons, UBA now should be precluded from 
maintaining this suit. As previously stated, this interpretation 
had been in effect for nearly ten years before UBA brought this 
suit. It is fair to conclude UBA "slept on its rights" during 
this long period of time, and hence has impliedly waived the 
right to bring an action now that would surely prejudice the 
defendant credit unions. 
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In its Order granting the motions to dismiss of the 
Commissioner and the CU Defendants, the Court in UBA v. AFCU said 
dismissal for laches and estoppel did not apply to UBA's 
complaint against CUSC. Obviously UBA could not have brought its 
challenge against CUSC at anytime within the past ten years, 
since CUSC has now been organized for only a little over a year. 
Thus the Court in UBA v. AFCU rightly ruled laches and estoppel 
would not apply to UBA's challenge to CUSC. However, where UBA 
in its petition for review of the Leary Order has again raised 
the multi-county field of membership issue to attack the approval 
of the CUSC Application, and it was the failure of UBA to 
challenge that policy until it had been around for ten years that 
caused the Court in UBA v. AFCU to rule that laches and estoppel 
would apply to UBA's challenge to the policy in that suit, this 
Court should apply laches and estoppel to UBA's attempt to 
challenge the policy on appeal with respect to the approval of 
the CUSC Application. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, the Court should uphold the determination of the 
Commissioner to approve the CUSC Application. 
DATED this day of May, 1994 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
Utah Department of 
Financial Institutions 
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EXHIBITS 
7-1-103. Definitions. 
As used in this title: 
(1) "Bankv means any person authorized under the laws of this state, 
another state, the United States, the District of Columbia, or any terri-
tory of the United States to accept deposits from the public. "Bank" does 
not include a federal savings and loan association or federal savings 
bank, a savings and loan association or savings bank subject to Chapter 7 
of this title, a thrift institution subject to Chapters 8 and 8a of this title, a 
federally chartered credit union, or a credit union subject to Chapter 9 of 
this title. 
(2) "Banking business" means the offering of deposit accounts to the 
public and the conduct of such other business activities as may be autho-
rized by this title. 
(3) "Board" means the Board of Financial Institutions as described in 
Section 7-1-203. 
(4) "Branch" means a place of business of a financial institution, other 
than its home office, at which deposits are received and paid. It does not 
include a consumer funds transfer facility as defined in Section 7-16-2. 
(5) "Business trust" means an entity engaged in a trade or business 
created by a declaration of trust, by the terms of which property is trans-
ferred to trustees, to be held and managed by them for the benefit of 
persons holding transferable certificates representing the beneficial in-
terest in the trust estate and assets. 
(6) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of financial institutions 
as described in Section 7-1-202. 
(7) "Control" means the power, directly or indirectly, to: 
(a) direct or exercise a controlling influence over the management 
or policies of a financial institution, or the election of a majority of 
the directors or trustees of an institution; or 
(b) (i) vote 20% or more of any class of voting securities of a finan-
cial institution by an individual; or 
(ii) vote more than 5c/c of any class of voting securities of a 
financial institution by a person other than an individual. 
(8) "Credit union" means any cooperative, nonprofit association incor-
porated under Chapter 9 of this title, or under the Federal Credit Union 
Act. 
(9) "Department" means the Department of Financial Institutions as 
described in Section 7-1-201. 
(10) "Depository institution" means any bank, savings and loan associ-
ation, savings bank, thrift institution, credit union, or any other institu-
tion which holds or receives deposits, savings, or share accounts, or issues 
certificates of deposit, or provides to its customers other depository ac-
counts which are subject to withdrawal by checks, drafts, or other instru-
ments or by electronic means to effect third party payments. 
(11) "Depository institution holding company" means: 
(a) a person other than an individual that has control over any 
depository institution or becomes a holding company of a depository 
institution under Section 7-1-703; or 
(b) a person other than an individual that the commissioner finds, 
after considering the circumstances of any specific case, is or is capa-
ble of exercising a controlling influence over a depository institution 
by means other than those specifically described in this section. Ex-
cept as provided in Subsection 7-1-703(7), a person is not a depository 
institution holding company by virtue of its ownership or control of 
shares acquired in securing or collecting a debt previously contracted 
in good faith. 
(12) "Directly connected" means being an employee, officer, director, or 
shareholder of an institution or a substantial depositor of or substantial 
borrower from a depository institution. 
(13) "Financial institution" means any institution subject to the juris-
diction of the department because of this title. 
(14) "Financial institution holding company" means a person, other 
than an individual that has control over any financial institution or any 
person that becomes a financial institution holding company under this 
chapter including a foreign bank holding company and a foreign savings 
and loan holding company. Ownership of a service corporation by a depos-
itory institution does not make that institution a financial institution 
holding company. A person holding 5% or less of the voting securities of a 
financial institution is rebuttably presumed not to have control of the 
institution. A trust company is not a holding company by reason of its 
owning or holding 20% or more of the voting securities of a financial 
institution in a fiduciary capacity, unless the commissioner finds, after 
notice and opportunity for hearing, that the trust company exercises a 
controlling influence over the management or policies of the financial 
institution. 
(15) "Foreign depository institution" means a depository institution 
whose home office is located in and whose operations are conducted prin-
cipally in a state other than Utah, in a territory or possession of the 
United States, or in the District of Columbia. 
(16) "Foreign depository institution holding company" means a deposi-
tory institution holding company whose subsidiary depository institu-
tion's operations are conducted principally in a state other than Utah, in 
a territory or possession of the United States, or in the District of Colum-
bia. 
(17) "Guaranty corporation" means the Industrial Loan Guaranty Cor-
poration of Utah. 
(18) "Industrial loan corporation" means a corporation or other busi-
ness entity conducting the business of an industrial loan corporation as 
described in Chapter 8 of this title. 
(19) "Insolvent" means the status of a financial institution which is 
unable to meet its obligations as they mature. 
(20) "Institution" means a corporation, partnership, trust, association, 
joint venture, pool, syndicate, unincorporated organization, or any form of 
business entity. 
(21) "Institution subject to the jurisdiction of the department" means 
an institution or other person described in Article 5 doing business or 
having an office in this state except to the extent those institutions or 
persons are engaged solely in making or soliciting loans to residents of 
this state or loans secured by property located in this state or are engaged 
solely in the activities described in Subsection 16-10a-1501(2)(l). 
(22) "Liquidation" means the act or process of winding up the affairs of 
an institution subject to the jurisdiction of the department by realizing 
upon assets, paying liabilities, and appropriating profit or loss, as pro-
vided in Chapter 2 of this title. 
(23) "Liquidator" means a person or an agency or instrumentality of 
this state or of the United States appointed to conduct a liquidation. 
(24) "Member of a savings and loan association" means: 
(a) a person holding a savings account of a mutual association; 
(b) a person borrowing from, assuming, or obligated upon a loan or 
an interest in a loan held by a mutual association; or 
(c) any person or class of persons granted membership rights by 
the articles of incorporation or the bylaws of an association. A joint 
and survivorship or other multiple owner or borrower relationship 
constitutes a single membership. 
(25) "Negotiable order of withdrawal" means a draft drawn on a NOW 
account. 
(26) "NOW account" means a savings account from which the owner 
may make withdrawals by negotiable or transferable instruments for the 
purpose of making transfers to third parties. A NOW account is not a 
demand deposit, and the owner of a NOW account, and any third party 
holder of an instrument requesting withdrawal from the account, does not 
have the legal right to make withdrawal on demand. 
(27) "Operations are principally conducted" means that state where the 
largest percentage of the aggregate deposits of a depository institution or 
all depository institution subsidiaries of a depository institution holding 
company are held. 
(28) "Person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, as-
sociation, joint venture, pool, syndicate, sole proprietorship, unincorpo-
rated organization, or any form of business entity. 
(29) "Receiver" means a person or an agency or instrumentality of this 
state or of the United States appointed to administer and manage an 
institution subject to the jurisdiction of the department in receivership, as 
provided in Chapter 2 of this title. 
(30) "Receivership" means the administration and management of the 
affairs of an institution subject to the jurisdiction of the department to 
conserve, preserve, and properly dispose of the assets, liabilities, and 
revenues of an institution in possession, as provided in Chapter 2 of this 
title. 
(31) "Savings account" means any deposit or other account at a deposi-
tory institution which is not a transaction account. 
(32) "Savings and loan association" means a mutual or capital stock 
savings association, a savings and loan association, a mutual or capital 
stock savings bank, or a building and loan association subject to the 
provisions of this title including all federal associations as defined in 
Subsection 7-7-2(3) and all foreign associations as defined in Subsection 
7-7-2(4). 
(33) "Service corporation" means a corporation or other business entity 
owned or controlled by one or more financial institutions which is en-
gaged or proposes to engage in business activities related to the business 
of financial institutions. 
(34) "Subsidiary" means a business entity under the control of a finan-
cial institution. 
(35) "Thrift institution" means any industrial loan corporation autho-
rized by the commissioner to receive deposits as provided in Chapter 8. It 
does not include a bank, a savings and loan association, or a-credit union. 
(36) "Transaction account" means a deposit, account, or other contrac-
tual arrangement in which a depositor, account holder, or other customer 
is permitted, directly or indirectly, to make withdrawals by check or other 
negotiable or transferable instrument, a payment order of withdrawal, a 
telephone transfer, or other electronic means, or by any other means or 
device for the purpose of making payments or transfers to third persons. 
This term includes but is not limited to demand deposits, NOW accounts, 
savings deposits subject to automatic transfers, and share draft accounts. 
(37) "Trust company" means any person authorized to conduct a trust 
business as provided in Chapter 5. 
(38) "Utah depository institution" means a depository institution 
which is organized under the laws of this state and whose home office is 
located in this state, or which is organized under the laws of the United 
States and whose home office is located in this state. 
(39) "Utah depository institution holding company" means a depository 
institution holding company whose principal subsidiary depository insti-
tution is a Utah depository institution. 
7-1-208- Supervisor of credit unions — Designation of ex-
aminer as — Qualifications — Responsibilities — 
Bond-
(1) The commissioner shall designate an examiner as supervisor of credit 
unions who shall be a citizen of the United States and shall have sufficient 
training and experience in the business of credit unions or as an employee of a 
state or federal agency supervising credit unions to demonstrate his qualifica-
tions and fitness to perform the duties of his office. 
(2) The supervisor of credit unions is responsible, subject to the direction 
and control of the commissioner, for the general supervision and examination 
of all credit unions subject to the jurisdiction of the department and other 
institutions assigned to him by the commissioner. He shall assist and advise 
the commissioner in the execution of the laws of this state relating to all such 
institutions, and shall perform other duties prescribed in this title or assigned 
to him by the commissioner. 
(3) Before entering upon his duties, the supervisor of credit unions shall 
give to the state a corporate surety bond in form and amount determined by 
the department, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties. The 
premium on the bond shall be paid by the state. 
7-1-303- Joint operations and information exchange by in-
stitutions. 
The commissioner may authorize institutions subject to the jurisdiction of 
the department to engage in such joint and cooperative actions as the commis-
sioner finds will be in the public interest, such as, but not limited to: 
(1) mutual exchange of financial information as to depositors, bor-
rowers, and other customers; 
(2) joint use of facilities; 
(3) joint operation of clearing houses and other facilities for payment of 
checks, drafts, or other instruments drawn on or issued by various classes 
of depository institutions; 
(4) joint participation in lending programs to promote the public wel-
fare; 
(5) joint risk management services; and 
(6) joint ownership, operation, or furnishing of electronic funds transfer 
services. 
7-1-501. Institutions and persons subject to jurisdiction of 
department. 
The following persons and institutions are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
department and are subject to supervision and examination by the depart-
ment as provided in this title and the rules and regulations of the department: 
(1) all banks; 
(2) all savings and loan associations; 
(3) all service corporations; 
(4) all credit unions; 
(5) all thrift institutions and industrial loan corporations; 
(6) all trust companies; 
(7) all escrow companies; 
(8) all other persons or institutions engaged in this state in the busi-
ness of: 
(a) guaranteeing or insuring deposits, savings, share accounts, 
thrift accounts, or other accounts in depository institutions doing 
business in this state, except the Credit Union Insurance Corporation 
or any insurer qualified under the insurance laws of this state to 
insur i shares and deposits of credit unions; 
(b) operating loan production offices for a depository institution 
located outside this state; 
(c) allowing persons to effect third party payments from loan, 
charge, or other accounts by checks, drafts, or other instruments or 
by electronic means; 
(d) operating an office in this state for the purpose of soliciting 
deposits or similar evidence of indebtedness or participation interests 
in them; 
(9) all corporations or other business entities owning or controlling an 
institution subject to the jurisdiction of the department; and 
(10) all subsidiaries and affiliates of an institution subject to the juris-
diction of the department. 
7-1-502, Limitations on jurisdiction of department, 
(1) The jurisdiction of the department with respect to the persons and insti-
tutions described in § 7-1-501 is limited as follows: (a) to that portion of the 
business activities conducted by those persons and institutions in this state or 
with residents of this state, whether conducted solely or jointly by combina-
tion or contract; (b) to business activities not wholly regulated or supervised 
by an agency or department of the United States or another agency or depart-
ment of this state; and (c) to business activities which the department is not 
prohibited from regulating by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 
(2) The jurisdictional limitations set forth in Subsections (l)(a) and (b) do 
not prohibit the commissioner from requiring all institutions described in 
§ 7-1-501 to make available for his inspection and examination their books 
and records applicable to their business subject to the jurisdiction of the de-
partment conducted in this state or with residents of this state, and to make 
available any reports filed with any federal or state supervisory agencies 
having jurisdiction over them. 
(3) The provisions of Subsection 7-l-501(7)(d) may not be construed to au-
thorize the department to supervise or regulate, by setting interest rates or 
otherwise, the operation of money market mutual funds or similar invest-
ments subject to supervision and regulation by another department or agency 
of this state or of the United States. 
(4) Notwithstanding the jurisdictional limitations set forth in Subsection 
(1), the department has jurisdiction over the establishment of an office for the 
purpose of soliciting deposits or similar evidence of indebtedness or participa-
tion interests in them or the acquisition or merger or consolidation with a 
depository institution or a depository institution holding company whose oper-
ations are principally conducted in this state by a depository institution or a 
depository institution holding company whose operations are principally con-
ducted outside this state. 
7-1-706. Application to commissioner to exercise power — 
Procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in §§ 7-1-704 and 7-1-705, any person may request 
the commissioner to issue any rule or order, to exercise any powers granted to 
the commissioner under this title, or to act on any matter that is subject to the 
approval of the commissioner by filing a request for agency action with the 
commissioner. 
(2) Within ten days of receipt of the request, the commissioner shall, at the 
applicant's expense, cause a supervisor to make a careful investigation of the 
facts relevant or material to such application. 
(3) (a) The supervisor shall submit his findings and recommendations in 
writing to the commissioner as required by the department's rules. 
(b) The application, any additional information furnished by the appli-
cant, and the findings and recommendations of the supervisor may be 
inspected by any person at the office of the commissioner, except those 
portions of the application or report that the rules of the department 
designate as confidential in order to prevent a clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of privacy. 
(4) (a) Before the hearing is held, the commissioner shall publish notice of 
the hearing at the applicant's expense in a newspaper of general circula-
tion within the county where the applicant is located at least once a week 
for three successive weeks before the date of the hearing. 
(b) The notice shall include the information required by the depart-
ment's rules. 
(c) The commissioner shall take action within 30 days after the close of 
the hearing, based on the record before him. 
(5) (a) If no hearing is held, the commissioner shall approve or disapprove 
the application based on the papers filed with him, together with the 
findings and recommendations of the supervisor, within 90 days of receipt 
of the application. 
(b) The commissioner shall take action on the application by issuing 
his findings of fact, conclusions, and an order, and shall mail a copy of 
each to: 
(i) the applicant; 
(ii) all persons who have filed protests to the granting of the appli-
cation; and 
(iii) whatever other persons that he considers should receive copies 
under the circumstances. 
(6) The commissioner may impose any conditions or limitations on his ap-
proval or disapproval of an application that he considers proper to: 
(a) protect the interest of creditors, depositors, and other customers of 
an institution; 
(b) protect its shareholders or members; and 
(c) carry out the purposes of this title. 
proval. 
(1) Except for classes of financial institutions the commissioner may desig-
nate by rule, any Utah depository institution or foreign depository institution 
authorized to do business in this state may establish one or more branches, 
subject to the prior approval of the commissioner. 
(2) Approval of the commissioner may be obtained by filing an application 
with the commissioner in the form the commissioner prescribes. The applica-
tion shall state: 
(a) the proposed location of the branch; 
(b) the date on which the applicant expects the branch to begin opera-
tions; 
(c) the estimated annual expense to operate it; and 
(d) any other information required by the department to enable it to 
assess the applicant's ability to open and operate the branch. 
(3) The commissioner shall approve or disapprove the application within 30 
days after it is accepted as complete. If the commissioner does not approve or 
disapprove an application within 30 days after it is accepted as complete, it is 
considered approved. 
(4) (a) The commissioner's approval of any application under this section is 
considered revoked unless the branch is opened and operating within one 
year of the date approved by the commissioner for commencement of 
operations. 
(b) The commissioner may, upon written application made before the 
expiration of that period and for good cause shown, extend the date for 
activation for up to two additional periods of not more than six months 
each. 
(5) A foreign depository institution with branches in Utah is not subject to 
the requirements of this section if the branch to be established is located 
outside of Utah. 
7-9-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Capital and surplus" means shares, deposits, reserves, and undi-
vided earnings. 
(2) "Corporate credit union" means any credit union organized pursu-
ant to any state or federal act for the purpose of serving other credit 
unions. 
(3) "Deposits" means that portion of the capital paid into the credit 
union^by members on which a specified rate of interest will be paid. 
(4) "Immediate family" means parents, spouse, surviving spouse, chil-
dren, and siblings of the member. 
(5) "Limited field of membership" means persons belonging to a group 
or persons designated as eligible for credit union membership who: 
(a) have a similar interest, profession, occupation, or formal associ-
ation with an identifiable purpose; 
(b) reside within an identifiable neighborhood, community, rural 
district, or county; 
(c) are employed by a common employer; 
(d) are employed within a defined business district, industrial park 
or shopping center; 
(e) are employed by the credit union; or 
(0 are members of the immediate family of persons within the 
above groups. 
(6) "Share drafts," "deposit drafts," and "transaction accounts" mean 
accounts from which owners are permitted to make withdrawals by nego-
tiable or transferable instruments or other orders for the purpose of mak-
ing transfers to other persons or to the owner. 
(7) "Shares" means that portion of the capital paid into the credit union 
by members on which dividends may be paid. 
In addition to the powers specified elsewhere in this chapter, a credit union 
may: 
(1) make contracts; 
(2) sue and be sued; 
(3) acquire, lease, or hold fixed assets, including real property, furni-
ture, fixtures, and equipment as the directors consider necessary or inci-
dental to the operation and business of the credit union, but the value of 
the real property may not exceed 7% of credit union assets, unless ap-
proved by the commissioner; 
(4) pledge, hypothecate, sell, or otherwise dispose of real or personal 
property, either in whole or in part, necessary or incidental to its opera-
tion; 
(5) incur and pay necessary and incidental operating expenses; 
(6) require an entrance or membership fee; 
(7) receive the funds of its members in payment for shares, share certif-
icates, deposits, deposit certificates, share drafts, NOW accounts, and 
other instruments; 
(8) allow withdrawal of shares and deposits, as requested by a member 
orally to a third party with prior authorization in writing, including, but 
not limited to, drafts drawn on the credit union for payment to the mem-
ber or any third party, in accordance with the procedures established by 
the board of directors, including, but not limited to, drafts, third-party 
instruments, and other transaction instruments, as provided in the by-
laws; 
(9) charge fees for its services; 
(10) extend credit to its members, at rates established by the board of 
directors and establish indexes for variable rate loans based on the credit 
union's cost of funds, rates paid on accounts, or other appropriate factors 
they may determine; 
(11) extend credit secured by real estate; 
(12) make loan participation arrangements with other credit unions, 
credit union organizations, or financial organizations in accordance with 
written policies of the board of directors, if the credit union that origi-
nates a loan for which participation arrangements are made retains an 
interest, of at least 10% of the loan; 
(13) sell and pledge eligible obligations in accordance with written pol-
icies of the board of directors; 
(14) engage in activities and programs of the federal government or 
this state or any agency or political subdivision of the state, when ap-
proved by the board of directors and not inconsistent with this chapter; 
(15) act as fiscal agent for and receive payments on shares and deposits 
from the federal government, this state, or its agencies or political subdi-
visions not inconsistent with the laws of this state; 
(16) borrow money and issue evidence of indebtedness for a loan or 
loans for temporary purposes in the usual course of its operations; 
(17) discount and sell notes and obligations; 
(18) sell all or any portion of its assets to another credit union or pur-
chase all or any portion of the assets of another credit union; 
(19) invest funds as provided in this title and in its bylaws; 
(20) maintain deposits in insured financial depository institutions as 
provided in this title and in its bylaws; 
(21) hold membership in corporate credit unions organized under this 
chapter or under other state or federal statutes, and in associations and 
organizations of credit unions; 
(22) declare and pay dividends on shares, contract for and pay interest 
on deposits, and pay refunds of interest on loans as provided in this title 
and in its bylaws; 
(23) collect, receive, and disburse funds in connection with the sale of 
negotiable or nonnegotiable instruments and for other purposes that pro-
vide benefits or convenience to its members, as provided in this title and 
in its bylaws; 
(24) make donations for the members' welfare or for civic, charitable, 
scientific, or educational purposes as authorized by the board of directors 
or provided in its bylaws; 
(25) act as trustee of funds permitted by federal law to be deposited in a 
credit union as a deferred compensation or tax deferred device, including, 
but not limited to, individual retirement accounts as defined by Section 
408, Internal Revenue Code; 
(26) purchase reasonable disability insurance, including accidental 
death benefits, for directors and committee members through insurance 
companies licensed in this state as provided in its bylaws; 
(27) provide reasonable protection through insurance or other means to 
protect board members, committee members, and employees from liabil-
ity arising out of consumer legislation such as, but not limited to, truth-
in-lending and equal credit laws and as provided in its bylaws; 
(28) reimburse directors and committee members for reasonable and 
necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their duties; 
(29) participate in systems which allow the transfer, withdrawal, or 
deposit of funds of credit unions or credit union members by automated or 
electronic means and hold membership in entities established to promote 
and effectuate these systems, if the participation is not inconsistent with 
the law and rules of the department, and if any credit union participating 
in any system notifies the department as provided by law; 
(30) issue credit cards and debit cards to allow members to obtain ac-
cess to their shares, deposits, and extensions of credit, if any such issu-
ance is not inconsistent with the law and rules of the department; 
(31) provide any act necessary to obtain and maintain membership in 
the credit union; 
(32) exercise incidental powers necessary to carry out the purpose for 
which a credit union is organized; 
(33) undertake other activities relating to its purpose as its bylaws 
may provide; 
(34) engage in other activities, exercise other powers, and enjoy other 
rights, privileges, benefits, and immunities authorized by rules of the 
commissioner; and 
(35) act as trustee, custodian, or administrator for Keogh plans, indi-
vidual retirement accounts, credit union employee pension plans, and 
other employee benefit programs. 
7-9-6. Formation of corporation to conduct credit union — 
Approval of commissioner. 
(1) Ten or more incorporators belonging to the same group of 200 persons or 
more having a limited field of membership may, with the approval of the 
commissioner, form a corporation to conduct a credit union under the provi-
sions of this chapter and under the provisions of Title 16, Chapter 10a, Utah 
Revised Business Corporation Act, and under the provisions of Title 7, Chap-
ter 1. The provisions of this chapter take precedence over conflicting provi-
sions of other state law governing the formation of the corporation and gov-
erning the duties and obligations of the corporation, and of its officers and 
stockholders or shareholders. 
(2) Except for regional and community groups, the commissioner may grant 
the approval referenced in Subsection (1) when satisfied that the proposed 
field of operation is favorable to the success of the credit union and that the 
standing of the proposed membership will give assurance that its affairs will 
be administered in accordance with this chapter. 
(3) The commissioner may grant approval to financially viable applicants, 
unless he finds that to do so would result in a substantial adverse financial 
impact on an existing credit union having the same or substantially the same 
limited field of. membership. 
7-9-11. Bylaws and amendments to be approved-
CD No credit union shall receive payments on shares, deposits, or certifi-
cates, or make any loans or other transactions, until its bylaws have been 
approved in writing by the commissioner. 
(2) Amendments to its bylaws shall not become operative until the bylaws 
have been approved by the commissioner. 
7-9-12, Contents of bylaws. 
The bylaws of a credit union shall contain at least the following: 
(1) the name of the credit union; 
(2) the purpose /or which it was formed; 
(3) the conditions of domicile or vocation which qualify persons or co-
operative societies for membership; 
(4) the number of directors and procedures for their election; 
(5) the term of directors; 
(6) the duties of the officers; 
(7) the time of year of the annual meeting of members; 
(8) the manner in which members shall be notified of meetings; 
(9) the number of members which shall constitute a quorum at meet-
ings; 
(10) the manner of amending; 
(11) the manner in which officers may act as surety; and 
(12) such other matters, rules, and regulations as the board of directors 
consider necessary. 
7-9-16. Members — Eligibility — Liability — Grounds for 
closing account — Denial of membership. 
(1) Any person within the limited field of membership of a credit union may 
be admitted to membership, upon (a) payment of any required entrance or 
membership fee, (b) payment for one or more shares, and (c) compliance with 
this chapter and the bylaws of the corporate credit union. 
(2) Members of the credit union may not be held personally or individually 
liable for payment of the credit union's debts. 
(3) The credit union may close the account of any member whose actions 
have resulted in any financial loss to the credit union. 
(4) Denial of membership is not considered a denial of credit. 
7-9-34. Tax exemption of credit unions. 
Credit unions organized under this chapter or prior law are exempt from 
taxation, except that any real property or any tangible personal property 
owned by the credit union shall be subject to taxation to the same extent as 
other similar property is taxed. This section does not exempt credit unions 
from sales or use taxes, or fees owed to the department in accordance with this 
title and rules of the department. 
7-9-47. Branch offices. 
(1) As used in this section "branch office" means a place where credit union 
operations are conducted other than the home office. 
(2) The establishment of a branch office shall be authorized by the board of 
directors and shall be subject to direction from the home office. Notice of the 
establishment of a branch office shall be given to the commissioner. 
(3) Every branch office shall file reports and be subject to examinations as 
may be required by the commissioner. 
(4) The board of directors of the credit union home office, after written 
notice to the commissioner, may discontinue the operation of any branch 
office. The written notice must state the date operation of the credit union 
branch office is discontinued. 
7-16-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Automated teller machine" means an unmanned, free-standing 
electronic information processing device, located separate and apart from 
a financial institution's principal office, branch, or detached facility, 
which uses either the direct transmission of electronic impulses to a fi-
nancial institution or the recording of electronic impulses or other indicia 
of a transaction for delayed transmission to a financial institution in 
order to perform financial transactions. 
(2) "Point-of-sale terminal" means a manned electronic information 
processing device, other than a telephone, located at the point of sale and 
separate and apart from a financial institution's principal office, branch, 
or detached facility, which uses either the direct transmission of elec-
tronic impulses to a financial institution or the recording of electronic 
impulses or other indicia of a transaction for delayed transmission to a 
financial institution in order to perform financial transactions. However, 
point-of-sale terminals includes electronic information processing devices 
which interface with the telephone transmission system and which, ei-
ther through the direct transmission of electronic impulses or the record-
ing and delayed transmission of electronic impulses to a financial institu-
tion, perform financial transactions. Nothing in this definition prevents a 
device which constitutes a point-of-sale terminal from being used to per-
form, for its operator, any internal business functions that are not finan-
cial transactions. 
(3) "Financial transaction" means cash withdrawals, deposits, account 
transfers, payments from deposit, loan or thrift accounts, disbursements 
under a preauthorized credit agreement, or loan payments and other sim-
ilar transactions initiated by an account holder. 
(4) "Consumer funds transfer facility" means either an automated 
teller machine, or a point-of-sale terminal, including any supporting 
equipment, structures, or systems. A point-of-sale terminal owned or op-
erated by and on the premises of a person primarily engaged in the busi-
ness of selling or leasing goods or non-financial services and capable of 
performing the functions of a consumer funds transfer facility, is not 
considered to be a consumer funds transfer facility unless connected on-
line or off-line to a financial institution for the purpose of performing 
financial transactions. 
(5) "Merchant" means a person primarily engaged in the retail sale or 
lease of goods or non-financial services. 
(6) "Control" means ownership, directly or indirectly, of a majority of 
the outstanding shares or more than 50% of the shares voted for the 
election of directors at the preceding election. 
EXHIBITS. 
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M E M O R A N D U M 
TO: Elaine Weis
 r / 
FRQ4: David A. Kwant JU&K 
DATE: Sept, 9, 1983 
SUBJECT: Overlapping fields of membership and bylaw amendments. 
For the past several years, credit unions in general have had significant 
growth not only from increased existing membership participation but also from 
adding additional groups outside of their original field of membershi p. This 
has included groups who were similar and .dissimilar to their original field of 
membership. The extent of the .department* s authority to restrict fields of 
membership as .defined" in 7-9-11 is not stated, A review of current state law 
governing credit unions indicates the following: 
A. Section 7-9-6 UCA indicates that the commissioner may approve new 
credit union applications - unless to .do so would have a 
substantial adverse financial impact on an existing credit union 
having the same or substantially the same limited field of 
membership. Therefore, a new credit union may or may not overlap 
an existing credit union .depending upon how the criteria of 7-9-6 
UCA were met. 
B. Bylaws, both original and amendments there to, are to be approved 
by the commissioner (7-9-11). There i s no provision in the law 
defining any basis on which a change in bylaws may be 
disapproved, other than a conflict with or violation of law. 
The state of Utah has one of the highest i f not the highest percentage of 
population participation in credit unions of any state in the nation. In 
addition, all of the large employers in the state are already sponsoring a 
credit union limiting the amount of growth or expansion that is available in 
the employer related limited field of membership. Several credit unions have 
expressed a.desire to include residence of areas .desi gnated in 7-9-3(5) UCA in 
their field of membership. Also, officials from employer groups have 
expressed a.desire to be allowed to join a credit union other than the one the 
employer is currently sponsoring. Because of the continued requests by credit 
unions to broaden their field of membership and the high percentage of credit 
union participation by the citizens of Utah, I would like to make the 
following recommendation regarding .department approval of requests to expand 
fields of membershi p: 
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Requests from employer groups for credit unions services from a 
credit union other than the credit union currently being 
sponsored by- the employer be approved. (Credit union members 
should be allowed to join that credit union which provides them 
with the best service.) 
Requests from existing credit unions for residential areas as 
stipulated by 7-9-3(5) UCA to be included in their field of 
membership be approved. This would not preclude more than one 
credit union from serving the same residential area. 
Document 0017U 
Approved this 9th day of September, 1983. 
< 5 ^ 6 K ^ /Z? &Jl JJ?C<I^ 
Elaine B. Weis, Commissioner 
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EXHIBITS 
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
STATE OF UTAH 
In re: : FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, 
APPLICATION OF CREDIT UNION : AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
SERVICE CENTERS OF UTAH, INC., : 
a Utah Corporation : Proceeding No. DFI-93-H001 
: Deputy Commissioner 
: Gary B. Doxey, presiding 
This matter came on for hearing on October 20, 1993 in the 
office of the Department of Financial Institutions. Mr. Bruce L. 
Richards of Bruce L. Richards and Associates and Mr. Robert R. 
Wallace of Hanson, Epperson & Smith appeared on behalf of the 
applicant, Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. Mr. Don B. 
Allen of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker appeared on behalf of the Utah 
Bankers Association. Mr. Bryce H. Pettey, Assistant Attorney 
General, appeared for the Department of Financial Institutions 
and its Commissioner. 
The following are the Findings, Conclusions, and 
Recommendations of the hearing officer, Gary B. Doxey. Included 
by reference as part of this document is the hearing officer's 
Memorandum Opinion dated November 18, 1993, which supports 
certain legal conclusions. 
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. Applicant, Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. 
("CUSC"), is a Utah corporation organized as a credit union 
service organization under the authority of Utah Administrative 
Code R337-4. On June 25, 1993, CUSC submitted its application to 
the Department under Utah Code Ann. §7-1-706 for authority to 
operate service centers on behalf of certain credit unions. 
2. After receiving supplementary correspondence from CUSC, 
the Department accepted the application as complete on August 23, 
1993. Orla Beth Peck, the Supervisor of Credit Unions, submitted 
her findings and recommendations to G. Edward Leary, the 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, on August 24, 1994. 
3. Well before that date, the Commissioner elected to hold 
a hearing on the application and delegated the responsibility of 
hearing officer to Gary B. Doxey, the Deputy Commissioner. 
4. On August 27, 1993, the Utah Bankers Association 
("UBA"), a Utah nonprofit corporation that serves as a trade 
association for the banking industry in Utah, filed a complaint 
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County seeking 
injunctive and declaratory relief. UBA named as defendants CUSC, 
18 state-chartered credit unions, 12 of which are shareholders of 
CUSC, and the Commissioner of Financial Institutions. UBA served 
the Commissioner with its complaint on September 1, 1993. 
- 2 -
5. On September 3, 1993, the Department mailed notice of 
the administrative hearing on the application to various trade 
representatives, federal regulators, and other interested 
parties, including CUSC, UBA, and their respective legal counsel. 
In accordance with Subsection 7-1-706(4), notice was also 
published in the Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret News one day 
each week for three successive weeks, specifically, on September 
8, 12, and 19, the last date being 30 days before the hearing. 
6. On October 19, 1993, UBA submitted a Notice of Protest 
to the holding of the administrative hearing and Comments in 
Opposition to the Application to Operate Service Centers. 
7. At the hearing on October 20, 1993, the hearing officer 
asked first for public comment of an informal nature. There 
being none, he declared the hearing to be a formal one and 
proceeded to take evidence and hear argument. Toward the end of 
the hearing, the hearing officer asked for supplemental memoranda 
from CUSC and UBA. Each filed memoranda with the Department on 
October 29, 1993, and reply memoranda on November 3, 1993. 
8. UBA objected to the legality of the hearing on two 
grounds: first, that primary jurisdiction to determine whether 
to approve the application had been removed to the district court 
by the filing of UBA's lawsuit; and second, that the hearing was 
improperly noticed and conducted under Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
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Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), rather than under 
the applicable provisions of Title 7 and the Department's rules. 
9. The Department has primary jurisdiction to determine 
whether to approve the application, as set forth in the hearing 
officer's Memorandum Opinion. 
10. The format and conduct of the hearing were proper, as 
set forth in the Memorandum Opinion. 
11. CUSC presented evidence at the hearing to support the 
feasibility, public benefit, and the safety and soundness of its 
planned operation of service centers. The following findings are 
appropriate: 
a. CUSC plans to own and operate service centers to 
service the members of all participating credit unions. 
Initially, only the current credit union shareholders of 
CUSC will participate. 
b. Fifteen credit unions own shares in CUSC. They 
include 12 state-chartered credit unions: Cyprus, 
MetroWest, Firefighters, Granite, Transwest, Utah Central, 
Salt Lake City, Jordan, Deseret First, Mountain America, 
ChevronWest, and Hercules. Three federally chartered credit 
unions are shareholders: VAMCU, Smith's Food & Drug, and 
Tooele Federal. 
c. In the future, assuming it obtains proper 
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approvals, CUSC plans also to service other credit unions, 
whether or not they are shareholders. If CUSC takes this 
step, the Department should reevaluate whether the applicant 
complies with Rule R337-4-3. 
d. Ultimately, CUSC envisions participating in 
interstate consumer funds transfer networks that will enable 
it to service members of out-of-state credit unions in much 
the same way that customers of financial institutions are 
now able to withdraw funds from out-of-state accounts 
through automated teller machines, 
e. For the present, CUSC agrees not to engage in 
interstate business from credit unions chartered by other 
states because of the legal questions it raises. 
f. The experience of a service center customer would 
be something like the following: A member of a 
participating credit union would approach a service center 
teller by first swiping an identification card through an 
electronic reader. The teller would then have access to the 
member's account information by means of an electronic data 
link directly to the member's credit union. The member 
could then deposit, transfer, or withdraw funds as he or she 
would do at the credit union. The member would also be able 
to fill out loan applications, which would be transmitted 
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back to the credit union for approval. The proceeds of the 
loan could be disbursed by the credit union at the service 
center. 
g. The employees of CUSC, not of any credit union, 
will operate the service centers. They will be trained to 
assist in all transactions, but the actual fund transfers 
and decisions will be made by the credit union, not CUSC 
employees. 
h. CUSC agrees that its employees will not, for the 
present, solicit credit union memberships at the service 
centers. 
i. CUSC employees will also refuse to reveal interest 
rates and other information about a particular credit union, 
except to the members of that credit union. 
j. The technology exists to keep accurate accounts and 
segregate records for each participating credit union. 
Adequate safeguards and internal controls can be put in 
place to avoid defalcation of funds and other problems. 
k. There is some question about the experience of 
CUSC's management and personnel, since this is a new type of 
operation. CUSC will seek expertise through consultation 
with shared service centers now operating in other states, 
notably, Michigan, Colorado, Alabama, Georgia, and 
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California. Some of these states have had long experience 
with shared service centers. CUSC plans to participate with 
the Southeast Group, a group of credit union service center 
corporations owned by credit union leagues or affiliated 
organizations from approximately 12 states. The Southeast 
Group currently operates or plans to operate service centers 
in all of those states. 
1. CUSC has presented uncontroverted evidence that 
participation in service centers will enhance the 
availability and economy of services to credit union 
members. Because the facilities are shared, they will 
decrease the capital outlay required of any one credit union 
to open a branch, thus improving the chances of a branch's 
success and reducing the financial risk to the institution. 
m. CUSC and its service centers will be subject to 
supervision and examination by the Department. CUSC agrees 
to obtain independent CPA audits of the service centers. 
n. Any credit union the Commissioner determines to be 
unsafe or unsound will be allowed or may be required to 
withdraw from participation in or ownership of CUSC. 
q. UBA does not question the safety and soundness of 
the applicant or its proposed operation of service centers; 
rather, it contests their legality. 
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12. The validity of CUSC as a credit union service 
organization ("CUSO") is clear, as is the fact that CUSOs are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Department under Subsection 7-
1-501(3) and Subsections 7-9-5(21) and (34). 
13. The Commissioner has authority to authorize CUSC to own 
and operate shared service centers, as is further explained in 
the hearing officer's Memorandum Opinion. 
14. Federally chartered credit unions are currently 
authorized by federal regulation to participate in shared service 
centers of the type CUSC proposes. Three of CUSC's shareholders 
are federal credit unions. 
15. CUSC is not a new class of depository institution 
because it does not, on its own behalf, take or hold deposits or 
engage in the other activities defining a depository institution. 
16. The service centers of CUSC are branches of each 
participating credit union, as is further explained in the 
hearing officer's Memorandum Opinion. The service centers are 
not consumer funds transfer facilities under Title 7, Chapter 16, 
Consumer Funds Transfer Facilities Act. 
17. At present, CUSC is not applying to open any particular 
location; thus its current application is not a branch 
application, but an application for approval of the service 
center concept. 
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18. Field of membership, the main legal issue in UBA's 
court case against the applicant, is not at issue here. The 
Department has had a clear position on field of membership for 
ten years. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of the foregoing, I recommend that the Commissioner 
approve the application of Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, 
Inc., subject to at least the following conditions: 
1. Each participating credit union should submit a branch 
application, with proper board approvals, for each service center 
location. 
2. The Department should reevaluate CUSC's continuing 
compliance with Rule R337-4 at such time as CUSC begins to 
service credit unions that do not hold shares of CUSC. 
3. The Department should evaluate for safety and soundness 
the ability of each participating credit union to invest or 
participate in CUSC service centers. A credit union whose safety 
and soundness is in jeopardy because of its investment in or 
participation with CUSC should be required or allowed to withdraw 
from participation. 
4. CUSC and its participating credit unions should adhere 
to all applicable laws on interstate deposit taking, branching, 
- 9 -
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and other activities. 
DATED this 18th day of November, 1993. 
7 r~TT 
Gary B. Doxey 
Deputy Commissioner 
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EXHIBITS 
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
STATE OF UTAH 
In re: : MEMORANDUM OPINION 
APPLICATION OF CREDIT UNION : 
SERVICE CENTERS OF UTAH, INC., : Proceeding No. DFI-93-H001 
a Utah Corporation : Deputy Commissioner 
: Gary B. Doxey, presiding 
This opinion considers four legal issues arising from the 
October 20, 1993 hearing in the above-captioned proceeding. The 
hearing dealt with the application of Credit Union Service 
Centers of Utah, Inc. ("CUSC") to operate shared service centers 
on behalf of certain credit unions. Additional facts and 
conclusions are set forth in the Findings, Conclusions, and 
Recommendations of the hearing officer dated November 18, 1993. 
This opinion is supplemental to that document and is incorporated 
in it by reference. 
The four issues are: 
1. Whether primary jurisdiction to approve or disapprove 
CUSC's application was removed to the district court by the 
filing of a lawsuit on August 27, 1993, by the Utah Bankers 
Association ("UBA") in Third District Court. 
2. Whether the Department of Financial Institutions' 
nnnan 
hearing on October 20, 1993, was improperly noticed and conducted 
under Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
("UAPA") . 
3. Whether shared service centers are legal; that is, 
whether the Commissioner has authority to authorize them. 
4. "Whether the proposed service centers should be 
considered branches, consumer funds transfer facilities, or both. 
I. Jurisdiction 
On August 27, 1993, UBA filed a complaint in the Third 
District Court of Salt Lake County seeking injunctive and 
declaratory relief. UBA named as defendants CUSC, 18 state-
chartered credit unions, 12 of which are shareholders of CUSC, 
and the Commissioner of Financial Institutions. UBA contends 
that the Commissioner has incorrectly interpreted Subsection 7-9-
3(5) to allow state-chartered credit unions to expand their 
geographical fields of membership illegally beyond county lines. 
That is, UBA claims that state law allows a credit union field of 
membership based on geography to cover no more than one county. 
UBA alleges that CUSC proposes to violate this and other 
provisions of the law by providing branching services beyond 
current geographical limits. UBA served the Commissioner with 
its complaint on September 1, 1993. 
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On September 3, 1993, the Department mailed notice of this 
administrative hearing to various trade representatives, federal 
regulators, and other interested parties, including CUSC, UBA, 
and their respective legal counsel. In accordance with 
Subsection 7-1-706(4), notice was also published in the Salt Lake 
Tribune and the Deseret News one day each week for three 
successive weeks, specifically, on September 8, 12, and 19, the 
last date being 30 days before the hearing. 
UBA argues that, by filing its complaint, it transferred to 
the district court primary jurisdiction over the question of 
CUSC's application. Viewed in its clearest light, UBA is 
claiming that the court has removal jurisdiction to determine 
whether to grant a request for administrative action. This 
concept is not supported by law. 
Subsection 7-1-501(3) explicitly grants the Department 
jurisdiction over "all service corporations," of which the 
applicant, CUSC, is one. CUSC correctly filed its application 
under Section 7-1-706. That section provides that the 
Commissioner may issue an order with or without a hearing and 
goes on to describe notice and other matters related to a 
hearing. No mention is made in that section or elsewhere in the 
Code of the possibility of removing to a court the Commissioner's 
jurisdiction over the application. Rather, Section 7-1-714 
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allows judicial review of "any rule, regulation, order, decision, 
or ruling or other act or failure to act" by the Commissioner. 
CUSC's application is a request for administrative action 
concerning an entity under the Department's jurisdiction; the 
hearing was held to aid in an administrative determination; and 
until the Commissioner rules, primary jurisdiction over the 
application lies with him rather than with the court. Settled 
principles of ripeness and administrative law support this 
conclusion. In short, the Legislature has granted to the 
Commissioner, not to the court, authority to rule in the first 
instance on CUSC's application. If UBA is dissatisfied with the 
Commissioner's order, it can seek judicial review. 
II. Applicability of Administrative Procedures Act 
UBA's second argument against the legality of the hearing is 
that it was improperly conducted under UAPA. The Department's 
notice of hearing did, in fact, cite to UAPA as well as to Title 
7 (Financial Institutions Act) and departmental rules for 
authority to conduct the hearing. Subsection 63-46b-l(2)(h) 
provides in relevant part: 
[UAPA] does not govern: . . . state agency action under 
Title 7, Chapter 1, Article 3, Powers and Duties of 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, and Title 7, 
Chapter 2, Possession of Depository Institutions by 
Commissioner, Title 7, Chapter 8a, Utah Industrial Loan 
Corporation Guaranty Act, Title 7, Chapter 19, 
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Acquisition of Failing Depository Institutions or 
Holding Companies, . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-l(2) (h). 
At the outset of the hearing, the hearing officer explained 
that it was the Department's position -- with some uncertainty --
that its authority for holding the hearing came under Title 7, 
Chapter 1, Article 3 and that the hearing was exempt from UAPA. 
But the Department chose to follow UAPA, in addition to its own 
procedures, to the extent applicable by analogy to give an added 
measure of fairness to the proceeding. Hearing Transcript, pp. 
6-7. The hearing officer also stated that the Department had 
crafted its notice of hearing to avoid prejudice by taking into 
account both its own rules and UAPA. Hearing Transcript, pp. 
174-180. 
UBA argues, and the Department agrees -- again, with 
uncertainty as to how a court would view the issue -- that all 
hearings of the Department come under Article 3, because Article 
3 contains the general powers of the Commissioner, including the 
power to conduct hearings. However, CUSC's application was filed 
under Section 7-1-706, a section in Article 7, not Article 3; and 
the section itself provides for a hearing. A hearing on the 
application is, therefore, arguably not within the UAPA exemption 
for Article 3. 
Adding to the Department's uncertainty is the fact that the 
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exemptions to UAPA found in Section 63-46b-l(2) are all narrowly 
drawn. That the Legislature adopted an exemption for the 
Department of Financial Institutions is instructive of the 
Department's need to act sometimes on very short notice and 
without a hearing to protect the interests of depositors and the 
public, such as in the case of insolvent institutions. The UAPA 
exemptions for Title 7, Chapters 2, 8a, and 19 all relate to 
insolvency.1 A reasonable inference can be drawn that the 
Legislature intended the Article 3 exemption to apply only to 
similar situations in which the Commissioner needed to exercise 
extraordinary power to protect the public. By characterizing 
Article 3 as containing all of the Commissioner's adjudicative 
powers, one is in essence arguing that the Legislature intended 
to exempt Title 7 in its entirety. But the specificity of the 
UAPA exemption does not support this assertion. Only Article 3, 
not the rest of Chapter 1, and only certain other chapters in 
Title 7 are exempt. 
As a practical matter, the parties were not prejudiced by 
the procedural format or conduct of the hearing. The adequacy of 
the notice in terms of due process is not at issue, and the 
'Chapter 8a creates the Industrial Loan Guaranty 
Corporation, which at the time UAPA was adopted in 1987, was 
being liquidated because of insolvency. Chapters 2 and 19 are 
exclusively concerned with insolvent and troubled institutions. 
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hearing complied with the Department's rules as well as with 
UAPA. UBA argued at the hearing that the Department's rules and 
relevant statutes in Title 7 afford greater protection because of 
the applicability of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and subpoena 
powers. Section 7-1-309 allows the Commissioner to establish 
rules consistent with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7-1-
310 grants the Commissioner subpoena power. However, UAPA 
includes similar provisions in Section 63-46b-7. UBA failed to 
show actual prejudice resulting from the conduct of the hearing 
or its procedural format. Consequently, the hearing is not 
invalidated because of its references to UAPA.2 
III. Legality of Shared Service Centers 
CUSC's application raises for the first time in this state 
the question of whether shared service centers are legal. 
Section 7-1-706, the provision under which CUSC's application was 
rightly filed, provides merely a procedure to request the 
2To be sure, UAPA may diverge from Title 7 on the question 
of judicial review. Under UAPA, the Court of Appeals or Supreme 
Court has jurisdiction to review the decision resulting from a 
formal adjudicative proceeding. Section 63-46b-16. The question 
is less clear for a ruling on a formal proceeding under Title 7. 
Solving this question is not within the scope of determining 
whether to approve CUSC's application. The Department should not 
decide where an appeal lies from its ruling. 
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Commissioner to exercise his powers. The legality of service 
centers depends, therefore, on whether the Commissioner has power 
to authorize them, that is, whether some other provision in Title 
7 allows them. 
Shared service centers are not specifically named in the 
Code either in the sense of an authorization or prohibition. 
"Joint facilities," however, are authorized in Section 7-1-303, 
which states: 
The commissioner may authorize institutions subject to 
the jurisdiction of the department to engage in such 
joint and cooperative actions as the commissioner finds 
will be in the public interest, such as, but not 
limited to: 
(1) mutual exchange of financial information as 
to depositors, borrowers, and other customers; 
(2) joint use of facilities: 
(3) joint operation of clearing houses and other 
facilities for payment of checks, drafts, or other 
instruments drawn on or issued by various classes 
of depository institutions; 
(4) joint participation in lending programs to 
promote the public welfare; 
(5) joint risk management services; and 
(6) joint ownership, operation, or furnishing of 
electronic funds transfer services. 
Utah Code Ann. §7-1-303. (Emphasis added.) 
The shared nature of service centers is the subject at issue 
here. Because joint use of facilities necessarily contemplates 
sharing, Section 7-1-303 appears on its face to be adequate 
authority to approve shared service centers. Subsection (2) is 
particularly relevant, but several of the other subsections cover 
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aspects of shared service centers too. The expansive phrase 
"such as, but not limited to" in this section allows the 
Commissioner latitude to authorize even other activities in the 
public interest. Thus, the Commissioner is on solid footing to 
authorize shared service centers. 
The exercise of the Commissioner's authority under Section 
7-1-303 is discretionary. If the Commissioner decides to approve 
service centers, he should, therefore, base his approval on 
findings such as that they are feasible, beneficial, in keeping 
with safety and soundness considerations, and otherwise in the 
public interest. From the perspective of the hearing officer, 
there is ample evidence to support such findings; the hearing 
officer's Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations set forth 
his own findings in this respect. 
Section 7-1-303 presents an ancillary question about whether 
a credit union service organization ("CUSO") is included among 
the "institutions subject to the jurisdiction of the department." 
Subsection 7-1-103(21) defines that phrase as including every 
entity subject to the Department's jurisdiction in Chapter 1, 
Article 5. Subsection 7-1-501(3), which is part of Article 5, 
places "all service corporations" under the Department's 
jurisdiction. Service corporations and service organizations are 
synonymous. These organizations include CUSOs, which have been a 
- 9 -
common and accepted part of both the state and federal regulatory 
fabric for many years despite somewhat sparse reference to them 
in statute,3 Therefore, CUSOs are institutions subject to the 
Department's jurisdiction and may, if authorized, engage in joint 
activities under Section 7-1-303. 
IV. Branch or Consumer Funds Transfer Facility? 
The question of whether shared service centers are correctly 
characterized as branches or as consumer funds transfer 
facilities ("CFTFs"), or both, is relevant to whether the 
Commissioner should require branching applications from the 
credit unions participating in each service center location. 
Subsection 7-1-103(4) defines "branch" as: 
a place of business of a financial institution, other 
than its home office at which deposits are received and 
paid. It does not include a consumer funds transfer 
facility as defined in Section 7-16-2. 
3See Subsections 7-9-5(21) and (34), the latter being the 
basis for the Department's CUSO rule, Rule R337-4. This rule 
contains most of the specifics on CUSOs. On the federal side, 
the authority for CUSOs is almost exclusively in regulation 
rather than statute. In fact, 12 C.F.R. §701.27(d)(5)(i) 
includes an explicit authorization for CUSOs to engage in "shared 
credit union branch (service center) operations." UBA argues 
that the federal notion of shared service centers is quite 
different from what CUSC proposes in Utah. But several federal 
credit unions now participate in shared service centers of the 
type CUSC plans to open. They do so with National Credit Union 
Association approval. 
- 10 -
Utah Code Ann. §7-1-103(4). 
This definition applies to the whole of Title 7. An additional 
definition for credit union branches applies solely to Section 7-
9-47, which requires the decision to open a new branch to be made 
by a credit union's board of directors. The definition reads: 
As used in this section "branch office" means an office 
of the credit union where deposits are paid and 
received other than the home office. 
Utah Code Ann. §7-1-47(1). 
The difference between the two branch definitions is the 
absence in Section 7-9-47 of an exclusion for CFTFs. This 
difference is irrelevant, however, because the definitions in 
Title 7, Chapter 16, Consumer Funds Transfer Facilities Act, make 
plain that CFTFs are not branches. 
CFTFs come in two varieties, according to Subsection 7-16-
2(4); they are either automated teller machines ("ATMs") or point 
of sale terminals ("POS terminals"). ATMs are defined in 
Subsection 7-16-2(1) as being unmanned. free-standing electronic 
information processing devices located off the premises of a main 
office or branch. POS terminals are manned electronic 
information processing devices, but they are also located off 
premises, according to Subsection 7-16-2(2). 
From these definitions, it is necessary to conclude that 
"branch" and "consumer funds transfer facility" are mutually 
- 11 -
exclusive legal designations. Indeed, the distinction is 
necessary. Without it, the state would be regulating every 
computer-equipped branch as a POS terminal, because every modern 
teller station is a manned electronic information processing 
device. It is not the device itself that creates a CFTF for 
regulatory purposes; the designation depends on where the device 
is located, and if it is at a branch it cannot be a CFTF. 
Of course, the proposed service centers have a little more 
in common with POS terminals than do other branches: service 
center customers need a magnetic card and a personal 
identification number to access the tellers. Nevertheless, 
service centers resemble branches far more than they resemble POS 
terminals. The following factors point to the service centers 
being branches: they require a bricks-and-mortar facility; they 
have lobbies; they have management and staff; they offer services 
like accepting loan applications and paying loan proceeds; some 
of these services are normally offered at branches and not 
normally available at an ATM or POS terminal; and the application 
itself makes clear that CUSC intends to offer virtually all 
credit union services at its service centers. Service centers, 
in short, fit the description of a "place of business of a 
financial institution." Subsection 7-1-103(4). They are not 
simply kiosks where certain transactions can be made. 
- 12 -
That service centers are branches does not present a legal 
impediment to authorizing them. UBA's arguments to the contrary 
ultimately tie back to field of membership. Field of membership 
is the main legal issue in UBA's court case against the 
applicant. The Department has had a clear and consistent 
position on field of membership for ten years and is not 
constrained to change its policy until a court of competent 
jurisdiction orders otherwise. Consequently, field of membership 
is not at issue for purposes of CUSC's application. 
UBA cites "field of operation," a phrase found in Subsection 
7-9-6(2), to resurrect field of membership as an issue. Field of 
operation is not the same as field of membership, and it is a 
legal requirement only for the initial grant of authority for a 
new credit union. It is not a legal requirement for branching. 
Service centers are only as geographically restricted as 
other branches. The Commissioner has discretion under Section 7-
1-708 to approve or disapprove a new branch based on legal and 
practical considerations related to the potential success of a 
branch. Of course, he would not approve a credit union branch 
located inconveniently in relation to the credit union members it 
serves. But that practical restriction does not create a legal 
impediment to branching beyond county lines. For example, a 
credit union with a geographic field of membership that includes 
- 13 -
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only Davis County residents is not legally restricted from 
opening a branch in Salt Lake County to serve its members who 
travel or work there. The question of approving the new branch 
would really hang on feasibility, i.e., whether enough Davis 
County members would use the branch office in Salt Lake County to 
justify the location. Soliciting new members in Salt Lake County 
is another matter, however, and would necessitate an approved 
amendment to the field of membership. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the hearing officer concludes that the 
Commissioner has jurisdiction to determine whether to approve the 
application of CUSC. The notice and conduct of the hearing were 
proper and not prejudicial or invalidated because of references 
to UAPA. Shared service centers are legal in concept; that is, 
the Commissioner has statutory authority to authorize them in the 
public interest. And the service centers are branches of the 
participating credit unions rather than consumer funds transfer 
facilities. 
DATED this 18th day of November, 1993. 
Gary B. ^ oxey 0 
Deputy Commissioner 
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EXHIBITS 
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0000O0000 
In Re: APPLICATION BY CREDIT : FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
UNION SERVICE CENTERS OF : ORDER CONDITIONALLY 
UTAH, INC. TO PROVIDE : APPROVING APPLICATION 
SERVICE CENTERS FOR UTAH : 
CREDIT UNIONS : 
0000O0000 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. On June 25, 1993, Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. ("CUSC"), a 
Utah corporation organized as a credit union service corporation, subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Department of Financial Institutions ("Department") pursuant to 7-1-501(3) of the Utah 
Code, filed an application with the Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the State of 
Utah ("Commissioner") in accordance with Section 7-1-706 of the Utah Code, requesting 
approval to operate service centers on behalf of certain Utah credit unions. The Department 
accepted the application as complete on August 23, 1993. 
2. The Supervisor of Credit Unions reviewed the application and on August 24, 
1993, submitted her findings and recommendation that the application be conditionally 
approved. On October 20, 1993, the Deputy Commissioner of the Department, designated 
by the Commissioner as a hearing officer, conducted an administrative hearing on the 
application and submitted his findings and recommendations on November 18, 1993, that the 
application be conditionally approved. The Supervisor of Credit Union's and the Deputy 
Commissioner's findings are incorporated herein by reference. 
3. CUSC is a credit union service corporation owned by fifteen credit unions 
including 12 state-chartered credit unions: Cyprus, MetroWest, Firefighters, Granite, 
Transwest, Utah Central, Salt Lake City, Jordan, Deseret First, Mountain America, 
ChevronWest, and Hercules; and three federally chartered credit unions: VAMCU, Smith's 
Food & Drug, and Tooele Federal. These stockholder credit unions have provided the initial 
capitalization of CUSC. Some of the capital will be used to meet the initial cash 
requirements for operations and the purchase of the software and equipment. 
4. CUSC proposes to open and operate service center(s) for participating credit 
unions. CUSC proposes to offer virtuaUy all credit unions services to members of 
participating credit unions on a shared cost basis. 
5. CUSC proposes to provide credit union services to other credit unions' 
members, not just those of CUSC shareholders. When CUSC initiates this expanded service, 
each state chartered credit union considering investing in CUSC stock, or availing itself of 
CUSC services must submit an application pursuant to Rule R337-4. The Department shall 
evaluate the applicant credit union based upon R337-4 criteria and determine whether the 
new credit union can safely and soundly make the investment and offer this service to its 
members. 
6. CUSC proposes to participate in interstate consumer funds transfer network 
that wDl enable it to service members of out-of-state credit unions in much the same way that 
customers of financial institutions are now able to withdraw funds from out-of-state accounts 
through automated teller machines. However, CUSC shall limit its activities to comply with 
all applicable interstate restrictions. 
7. With this application, CUSC is not applying to open any particular location; 
thus its current application is not a branch application, but an application for approval of the 
service center concept. 
8. CUSC proposes to conduct operations in the following manner: A member of 
a participating credit union would approach a service center teller by first swiping an 
identification card through an electronic reader. The teller would then have access to the 
account information of the member by means of an electronic data link directly to the 
member's credit union. The member could then deposit, transfer, or withdraw funds as he 
or she would do at the credit union. All teller transactions result in immediate updating of 
balances at the member's credit union. The member may approach a loan officer and 
complete a loan application, which would be transmitted back to the host credit union for 
approval. The proceeds of the loan could be disbursed by the credit union at the service 
center. With the identification card, the member may access an electronic bulletin board that 
will provide deposit and loan rates along with other credit union messages for members. 
9. During the first year of operation, CUSC proposes to share the cost of 
providing service center services upon a per member basis. Each stockholder credit union 
will be charged a fee based upon the number of members within a certain geographic area in 
the vicinity of the facility. After the first year, the costs will be based upon the number of 
transactions performed for each credit union. 
10. CUSC proposes to install conventional automated teller machines as part of the 
service center operations for 24 hour access. 
11. CUSC proposes that only its employees, not those of any participating credit 
union, will operate the service center(s). CUSC employees will be trained to assist in all 
transactions, but the actual fund transfers and decisions shall be made by the participating 
credit union, not CUSC employees. 
2 
12. cusC proposes that its t iiiployn11, \ ill iiiiiiii1, I'm illiur prcsnil soliril credit mil 
memberships at the service center(s). 
13 CUSC proposes that its employees will not reveal interest rates or otu~-
proprietary information of a particular credit union, except to the members of tv.r " 
union, 
1 1- CUSC will employ technology to keep accurate accounts and segregate records 
for each participating credit union, including provisions for data back-up and system 
restoration in the event of failure. CUSC shall obtain a yearly independent CPA audit. 
Safeguards and internal controls will be in place to avoid defalcation of funds and other 
problems. All appropriate physical security measures shall be taken to ensure physical safety 
of funds and documents. 
j 5 gase(j UpQn repreSentations of National Credit Union Administration 
("NCUA") officials, all deposit transactions completed at CUSC service centers will be 
insured by the NCUA. 
16 Since CUSC's proposal is a new concept in delivery of financial services in 
Utah, CUSC's management and personnel shall seek expertise through consultation with 
existing shared facilities in other states. 
ie Department determines that the investment in, or ownership of, CUSC is 
safer\ and soundness of a participating state chartered credit union, the 
e a!k wed or requi red to withdrav • from, participation i n, or ownership of. 
L 
18. Due to the uniqueness of the proposal and its sigi lificant public polk 
implications, the Commissioner decided to hold an administrative hearing on the appbcation 
to hear public comment, and to allow CUSC and any objecting party a forum *~ ~™ , ;^ 
comments, prior to the Commissioner's ruling on the application. 
19. On August 27, 1993, the utan i ocia.-on ("UBA"), a Utah nonprofit 
corporation that serves as a trade association for the banking industry in Utah, fded a 
complaint in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County seeking injunctive and 
declaratory relief. UBA named as defendants CUSC, 18 state-chartered credit unions, 12 of 
which are shareholders of CUSC, and the Commissioner, UBA served the Commissioner 
with its complaint on September 1. 1993 
20. Oi ^ . . 
hearing on the application \ . . 
interested parties, including ! SC. 11 \ an.* \hcr -^p :tive legal .our
 :. The Department 
also published notice of the hearing in *. A-K: mee u ith Subsection 7-1 *\n(4i of the Utah 
Code in the Salt Lake Tribune and tL Deserct W.* '>: SepvrnhrT t; m "* v 
1 
3 
21. On October 19, 1993, UBA submitted a Notice of Protest to the holding of the 
administrative hearing and Comments in Opposition to the Application to Operate Service 
Centers. UBA objected to the legality of the hearing on two grounds: first, that primary 
jurisdiction to determine whether to approve the application had been removed to the district 
court by the filing of UBA's lawsuit; and second, that the hearing was improperly noticed 
and conducted under Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Administrative Procedures Act, rather than 
under the applicable provisions of Title 7 and the Department's rules. 
22. The administrative hearing was held on October 20, 1993. The Hearing 
Officer submitted his Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations and legal opinion on 
November 18, 1993. 
23. The Commissioner, based upon the record before him, giving due 
consideration to the entire application process, including the Credit Union Supervisor's 
Findings and favorable recommendation, the administrative hearing officer's Findings and 
favorable recommendation, and consultations with the Attorney General's Office, finds that: 
A. The Department has primary jurisdiction to determine whether to 
approve CUSC's application. 
B. Pursuant to Section 7-1-303 of the Utah Code, the Department has 
authority to authorize CUSC to own and operate shared service center(s) as a joint and 
cooperative action of participating credit unions. 
C. Pursuant to Section 7-1-501 of the Utah Code, CUSC is a credit union 
service coiporation, subject to the jurisdiction of the Department, including examination and 
supervision. 
D. The Department has discretion under Section 7-1-708 of the Utah Code 
to approve or disapprove a new branch based on legal and practical considerations related to 
the potential success of a branch. 
E. CUSC service center(s) are branches of each participating credit union, 
not consumer funds transfer facilities, as defined in Section 7-16-2 of the Utah Code. 
F. CUSC service center(s) are only as geographically restricted as other 
branches. 
G. The format and conduct of the administrative hearing were proper. 
H. Field of membership, the main legal issue in UBA's court case against 
CUSC, is not at issue in this application. The Department has had a clear and consistent 
position on field of membership for ten years. 
4 
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1 1 "I BA's objections go to the legality of CUSC and its proposed service 
center(s), not its safety and soundness. 
24 Federally chartered credit unions are currently authorized by federal regulation 
to participate in shared service centers of the type CUSC proposes. Three of CUSC's 
shareholders are federal credit unions. 
25, CUSC has presented uncontroverted evidence that participation in service 
centers will enhance the convenience and availability of credit union services to credit union 
members. The reduction of costs through a cost sharing mechanism enhances the return to 
credit union members and warrants an opportunity to develop this concept of service delivery 
for Utah credit union members. The risks inherent in providing any new method of 
delivering services are present, but is mitigated by the phased, step-by-step approach of 
CUSC. In keeping with Utah's desire to be on the forefront of technology utilization, 
service centers present an undeniable opportunity for all financial institutions. Credit ur 
service centers are in the best interest of the public. 
r 
Based on the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, and pursuant to Section 7-1-706 of 
the Utah Code, the Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the State of Utah approves the 
application of Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. to operate service centers on behalf 
of certain Utah credit unions, subject to the following conditions; 
1. CUSC, as a service corporation, is subject to the supervision and examination 
of the Department. The Department shall have the authority to conduct examinations of each 
service center. CUSC shall provide quarterly financial statements to the Department, until 
the Commissioner approves a different reporting requirement 
2. CUSC shall obtain an annual audit of its financial statement by an. independent 
certified public accountant. 
3. Each state chartered credit i inioi i Dai ticipating in CUSC's service center(s) 
shall submit a branch application to the . , . . * .uant to Section 7-1-708 for approval 
to participate at each and every service center loc; 
4 Any state chartered credit union participating in a service center(s) that may 
be the subject of a supervisory or regulatory action by the Commissioner for which it is 
determined that participation in the service center(s) constitutes an unsafe or unsound 
practice, shall be allowed to withdraw from participation, pursuant to the submitted 
Participation Agreement. 
5 
5. Any state chartered credit union that is a shareholder of CUSC and may be the 
subject of a supervisory or regulatory action by the Commissioner for which it is determined 
that continued investment in CUSC constitutes an unsafe or unsound practice, shall be 
allowed to sell its stock back to CUSC, an existing CUSC stockholder, or other person in 
accordance with CUSC bylaws. 
6. Any state chartered credit union, not one of the original twelve listed in the 
application, desiring to acquire CUSC stock must have the prior written approval of the 
Commissioner as to the appropriateness of this investment for the credit union. 
7. CUSC and each state chartered credit union participating in the service 
center(s) shall maintain adequate bond coverage. 
8. CUSC shall submit to the Department for approval all proposed changes to the 
Bylaws, Management Services Agreement, Participation Agreement and Shareholder 
Agreement. 
9. CUSC shall comply with all applicable interstate restrictions. 
DATED this 19th day of November, 1993 
G. Edward Leary 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions 
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1805 South Redwood Road 
P O Box 25786 
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IN AND FUR SALT LAKE COUNTV STATE 01 II Il" Ml 
UTAH BANKERS ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION, 
et a] , , 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT 
Case No. 930904939 CV 
J u d g e M i c h a e l R. I l u i ^ . ^ 
The above e n t i t l e d m a t t e r came b e f o r e t h e C o u r t on I Hi 
Defendan t« r Mo t ions i< I 11 in i » IIIIHII I in SummaHi linlgment and t h e 
P l a i n t i f f ' s Mi; I . , I .>r Summai \ " " ' » n , TJHI < i in I i . 
S a p e r s t e i n and F i « n i t i l a d e ot hd, u u m n e y anil llMh'beker a p p e a r e d 
1 P l a i n t i f f , I HULL I  I  i I n i ir 11! • i I B r u c e I I in h ' i r r i ' l1. 
A s s o c i a t e s a n d R o b e i I I I J a i l a n i I III UIIL MII I | i i i • i in mil in t I In 
a p p e a r e d f o r t h e D e f e n d a n i i i n n ! u n i o n s ar id Cred im u n i o n S e r v i c e 
C II III I mi ) i i p r t l i | A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y Conera l , 
a p p e a r e a x ci tui i tmissioi tei ut l« i n a n c i d l i n s L i t u t luiii1 in i I 
argument was held on Monday, November 22, 1993. The Court entered 
its Memorandum Decision and Order on March 17, 1994. This 
Memorandum Decision and Order contains the Court's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. A copy of the Memorandum Decision and 
Order is attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
Based upon the foregoing and good cause appearing 
therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Motion of Defendant Credit Unions and Credit 
Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. to Dismiss and for Summary 
Judgment is granted; 
2. The Defendant G. Edward Leary's Motion to Dismiss, 
or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; 
3. The Plaintiff's Complaint against all Defendants is 
dismissed with prejudice, the Plaintiff not having standing, and 
its claims for injunctive relief, except as to Credit Union Service 
Centers of Utah, Inc., being barred by the doctrines of laches and 
estoppel; 
4. The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
denied with prejudice, the Plaintiff not having standing, and its 
claims for injunctive relief, except as to Credit Unions Service 
Centers of Utah, Inc., being barred by the doctrines of laches and 
estoppel; and 
5. The Defendants are awarded their costs of Court. 
2 
DATED this day of March, I M^M 
\\ i '1 III' i i m i I 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
District Judge 
APPROVED /" «~ "ORM: 
iCE H. PETTEY 
torney for G. Edward Leary, 
' Commissioner of Financial Institutions 
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
HAND DELIVERED t* _ 
foregoing and attached ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT i-o: 
Mr. Don B. Allen 
Mr. Herschel J. Saperstrin 
Mr. Kevin G. Glade 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, 84145-0385 
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SACfc^KE COUNTY 
•*•' / • / UtputyCfcrfc 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 8TATE OF UTAH 
THE UTAH BANKERS ASSOCIATION 
a Utah nonprofit corporation, 
Plaintiff , 
v s . 
AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 930904939 
The Utah Bankers Association, a trade association for the 
banking industry, initiated this lawsuit against Credit Union 
Service Centers, Inc. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the 
Service Center11) , a number of individual Utah credit unions 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the credit unions"), and G. 
Edward Leary, Utah Commissioner of Financial Institutions 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the Commissioner"). Neither 
the State of Utah nor the Department of Financial Institutions 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the Department" or "the 
State") are formally parties. 
In essence, the Bankers Association seeks statutory 
interpretations (1) which would limit a credit union's operations 
to a single county unless justified by a nongeographic, 
associational relationship of members in different counties, and 
UBA V . AMERICA F I R S T PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(2) nli 11 In winolrl p r o h i b i t flit" Trrvic* ' ""— ^ a f f e c t i r - -
f 1mi « Iin 11 ed i ntPT rt nint \ b r a n c h i n g *» c o n s t i t u e n t 
C 1 1 1 1 1 1 (11 i t II 1  I I I II 1 il : S U b l U x 
for summary judgment . 1 No p a r l y ^ sugges ted 
V, i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t p r e c l u d i n g summary judcrmer* 
consequence , LUL LLUIL u n i I IL . I I . I. ML. .+** a s u, ;~ispu 
c e r t a i n l y no t IIII i» mi Il t h a t rA a m i i nu") qu< r" c-re r e so lvec f * 
? J e n k i n s v, Swan i 
I BACKGROUND 
T • ::: n i d e i s i din I I II if IIII I IIII I I II mi I l l 1 | i l l i , HI 1 M 1M |i IM I I I 1 ii 
n e c e s s a r y . The M nnomii I mi HK»J I nl I IIi Il I 1'ijO's, and iii:ly 
19 3 0 ' s deprived I il 11 o t 1 i in i t ed means ri 11ri t»i P middle i l a s s of 
a c c e s s t o c r e d i t . Laws govern ing I lini I urn iiiiiiil j MM iiitill | i ml i in I 
credit unions were designed to improve that accc The applicable 
la\ is gener a] 3 y requi red that credit union membe - *. -^1 + 0* +r 
those with some specified I. elalxunnlii^ urn a 
conditions are commonly :;i: eferenced b}» the tern mited field 
1
 E = .f e n d a n t s ' mot ions a r e ' for cJisim i ••••• i l under I Iu3 € \ 
12(b) (6) , Utah Rules of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , 1 ui .i I I ^ r ^ ^ l v e ] > s • t< = :1 : 
summary judgment . 
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membership.11 This requirement of a relationship or association 
among members manifest in a limited field of membership was 
perceived as a bond, conducive to the making of loans, the 
repayment of loans and the overall success of credit unions* See 
First Nat'l Bank and Trust v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin,. 988 F.2d 
1272, 1274, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
The Utah statutes reflect the concept of a limited field of 
membership in both geographical and nongeographical terms. The 
nongeographical relationships which are authorized for the 
formation of a credit union include common profession, occupation 
or employer. Section 7-9-3 (5) (a) and (c) , Utah Code Ann. Two 
specific provisions of the Utah Code allow the formation of a 
credit union among members with only a geographical relationship, 
Section 7-9-3(5)(b) and (d). The members must 
. . . . 
(b) reside within an identifiable 
neighborhood, community, rural district, or 
county; [or] 
. . . . 
(d) [be] employed within a defined 
business district, industrial park or shopping 
center[.] 
Plaintiff claims that these limitations prohibit credit unions 
from having a geographical field of membership beyond a single 
county unless separately and independently justified under the 
nongeographical statutory provisions. The Utah statute governing 
UBA V. AMERICA FIRST PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the merger of credit unions, however, makes no reference to a 
limited field of membership. Section 7-9-39(1) allows any credit 
union to merge with another credit union upon compliance with 
certain procedures, none of which relate to a limited field of 
membership. Eleven of the individual defendant credit unions 
include members as a result of mergers with other credit unions. 
The Commissioner and his predecessors have for at least a 
decade taken the position that Utah's geographic limited field of 
membership provisions do not confine a credit union's membership to 
a single county. In September, 1983, the Department articulated a 
policy which would not geographically limit credit unions within 
the state. David A. Kwant, the Department's then supervisor of 
credit unions, expressed this as a recommendation in a memorandum 
to the then Commissioner, Elaine Weis, who immediately approved the 
policy. (The memorandum has become known as the "Kwant Memorandum" 
and is hereafter referred to as such.) 
The Department's expansive geographic interpretation of the 
limited field of membership provisions in the Utah Code, as 
reflected in the Kwant Memorandum, was specifically referenced in 
Report No. 90-09 to the Utah State Legislature, A Performance Audit 
of the Department of Financial Institutions, March, 1990. This 
audit and the Department's broad interpretation of the statutes 
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geographically limiting a credit union's field of membership were 
the subject of discussion at an April, 1990 meeting of the 
legislature's Business and Labor Interim Committee. This meeting 
was attended by Lawry Alder representing the plaintiff, the Utah 
Bankers Association. The undisputed facts indicate that the 
Department's practice of allowing credit unions to operate in 
multiple counties, even when a nongeographic relationship did not 
exist between members, could not have been a surprise to the 
Bankers Association, then or now. 
II. DEFERENCE TO COMMISSIONER 
The credit unions and the Commissioner suggest that this court 
should defer to the Department's expansive interpretation of the 
Utah Code provisions on the limited field of membership for credit 
unions. The Kwant Memorandum, the genesis of the Department's 
interpretation, is something less than an elaborate legal analysis. 
It emphasizes credit union growth and desire for further growth 
rather than legal principles. Furthermore, the ultimate question 
presented by the Bankers Association is neither factual nor a mixed 
question of fact and law. It is purely a question of law, and the 
expertise of the Department does not place it in a better position 
than this court to interpret the statutes enacted by the 
UBA V. AMERICA FIRST PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
legislative branch. See Savage Industries, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n., 
811 P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1991); Hurley v. Industrial Comm'n.. 767 
P.2d 524 (Utah 1988). 
III. STANDING 
Merely because this court need not defer to the executive 
branch, represented by the Department, does not necessarily mean 
the court must or should resolve the ultimate issue2 raised by the 
Bankers Association. The plaintiff must first establish that it 
has standing to submit the issue for judicial resolution. A 
plaintiff's standing merely establishes that a court with 
jurisdiction must or ought to resolve the dispute. 
For an association such as the Utah Bankers Association to 
have standing to bring a lawsuit such as this, its members must 
have standing and the individual participation of these members 
must not be necessary. Society of Professional Journalists v. 
Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1175 (Utah 1987). For purposes of 
considering the outstanding motions, the court assumes that the 
2
 The ultimate issue is, of course, whether there exist 
geographic limits on a credit union's field of membership. This 
ultimate issue underlies and pervades the plaintiff's challenge to 
the Service Center. As a consequence, the Court's analysis of 
standing in substantial part applies to the Service Center 
allegations. 
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Utah Bankers Association is appropriately representative of its 
members and their individual participation in the litigation is 
unnecessary. As a consequence, the court will focus on the 
standing of the members. 
Standing in Utah is resolved primary by determining whether 
the plaintiff, or in this case the member banks of the Utah Bankers 
Association, have suffered a distinct injury. If no such distinct 
injury exists, plaintiff may still have standing if the case 
presents issues of great importance which ought to be resolved, and 
it is unlikely that any other plaintiff will present such issues. 
National Parks and Conservation Assoc, v. Board of State Lands, 215 
Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22-23 (1993); Terracor v. Board of State Lands 
& Forestry. 716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986). 
Proper application of these criteria requires an appreciation 
of the very purposes of the doctrine of standing which acts as a 
sieve, winnowing out those cases inappropriate for resolution by 
the judiciary. This sifting function is in part to prevent the 
conversion of the courts into a supervisor of "the coordinate 
branches of government. . . [and] an open forum for the resolution 
of political and ideological disputes about the performance of 
government." Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah 1978). 
Without the doctrine of standing, the courts would become a 
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generalized grievance center for matters more appropriately 
directed to the executive and legislative branches. Society of 
Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah 
1987). It is against this background that the court applies the 
standing criteria to the facts of this case. 
For the Bankers Association to qualify under the primary 
standing criteria it roust demonstrate not just injury, but injury 
which is "distinct", "palpable", and "particularized". Society of 
Professional Journalists v. Bullock. 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah 
1987); Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). The mere 
allegation of adverse impact is insufficient. Jd. at 1150; 
National Parks and Conservation Assoc, v. Board of State Lands. 215 
Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (1993). 
The Bankers Association appears to presume injury merely 
because there is some acknowledged competition generally between 
banks and credit unions. While this per se approach may represent 
federal law,3 Utah does not presume distinct, palpable and 
particularized injury merely because of competition. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that a disappointed prospective purchaser 
of state school lands might have standing to challenge a lease to 
3
 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations Inc. 
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-52 (1970). 
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another as long as standing is not premised on business 
competition. Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry. 716 
P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1986). Even in the absence of this admittedly 
oblique reference by the Utah Supreme Court, this court is 
unwilling to blindly equate some general notion of competition and 
standing. Further analysis is desirable. 
At the outset, the court notes that the approach in federal 
courts is based on a case where a Comptroller of the Currency's 
ruling would allow competition which did not previously exist. 
Furthermore, the competitor alleging injury could demonstrate loss 
of two specific accounts. Assoc, of Data Processing Service 
Organizations. Inc. v. Camp. 397 U.S. 150, 151-52 (1970). As a 
consequence, the new competitive impact on the plaintiff was patent 
and particularized. 
This case, however, does not present a circumstance of new 
competition, nor is there any showing of specific loss of business 
to credit unions. There has always been and will always be 
competition between banks and credit unions, even if the Bankers 
Association were to prevail on the merits. In a hypothetical 
market where credit unions were limited to a single county unless 
they independently justified multicounty membership on 
nongeographic grounds, banks would still face the following credit 
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union competition: (1) county-by-county competition with credit 
unions whose fields of membership were limited to a single county; 
(2) multicounty competition with those credit unions whose fields 
of membership were associational, not geographic; and (3) credit 
unions whose geographic fields of membership were expanded by 
merger. Additionally, it would be necessary to factor in the 
competition of federal credit unions and other financial 
institutions which offer any banking service. Contrasting such a 
hypothetical market with the existing market where credit unions 
are not geographically limited4 would be, at best, an imprecise 
endeavor. As a consequence, this court cannot conclude that banks 
would fare better in the hypothetical market than in the existing 
market. 
The court is willing to assume diversion of some deposit 
accounts, loans and credit card accounts from banks to credit 
unions. The court, however, is unable to assume that the cause of 
such diversion is in part attributable to multi-county credit union 
membership which is not the result of merger and not the result of 
nongeographic justification for multi-county operations. Moreover, 
4The Commissioner, of course, retains extensive discretionary 
authority to control the creation and expansion of credit unions. 
See, e.g., Sections 7-1-305, -307, -311, -704, -705, -712; 7-9-11, 
-37, -39, -41, Utah Code Ann. 
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any court ordered injunction, whether retroactive or only 
prospective, prohibiting multi-county credit union membership in 
the absence of merger or nongeographic, associational 
justification, would not necessarily reduce the claimed injury. 
Unless such causation and effectiveness of remedy is demonstrated, 
distinct, palpable and particularized injury is not manifest. 
National Parks and Conservation Assoc, v. Board of State Lands, 215 
Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (1993); Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 
(Utah 1983). 
Any market analysis of competitive injury must necessarily 
consider the impact of outside forces such as state and federal 
taxation. Credit unions are generally exempt from such taxation. 
See Section 501(c)(14)(A), Internal Revenue Code; Sections 7-9-34, 
59-7-105(1) (a) and (e) , Utah Code Ann. Banks do not enjoy similar 
exemptions. The Bankers Association acknowledges the competitive 
significance of these differences. Paragraph 24 of the Complaint 
in this case alleges that such tax exemptions afford credit unions 
a competitive advantage over banks. When these tax consequences 
are superimposed on a pure market analysis of competitive injury, 
the Bankers Association's claim of injury flowing from allegedly 
unlawful, multicounty credit union membership becomes sufficiently 
dissipated that it fails to meet the threshold of distinct, 
palpable and particularized injury. 
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The Bankers Associations' failure to demonstrate injury 
sufficient to justify standing to sue does not fully resolve the 
standing issue. If the Association can establish that this 
litigation presents weighty issues of sufficiently great importance 
that they ought to be resolved and if it is unlikely that any other 
plaintiff would venture to present such issues for resolution, the 
Utah Bankers Association may well have standing to pursue this 
litigation. National Parks and Conservation Assoc, v. Board of 
State Lands. 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22-23 (1993). A grant of 
standing under this standard, however, is reserved for truly unique 
circumstances. Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1150-51 (Utah 
1983); Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock. 743 P.2d 
1166, 1170 n.4 (Utah 1987); National Parks and Conservation Assoc, 
v. Board of State Lands. 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 23 (Utah 1993). 
None of the defendants have suggested that there is a more 
appropriate plaintiff than the Bankers Association who is disposed 
to raise the same issues as those presented in this litigation. As 
a consequence, this court assumes that only the Bankers Association 
has the incentive and resources to pursue similar litigation. The 
absence of a more appropriate plaintiff, however, does not 
necessarily assure standing for this plaintiff. Jenkins v. Swan, 
675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983). The issues presented roust be 
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weighty and more appropriate for resolution by the judicial branch 
than the executive or legislative branches. Id, at 1150-51. 
The nature of the issues which are of sufficient weight to 
grant standing to a plaintiff in the absence of distinct, palpable 
and particularized injury have variously been characterized by the 
Utah Supreme Court as questions of "great public interest and 
societal impact", "important public issues", questions "of 
substantial public import", and issues of "great public 
importance". Id. at 1150, 1151; Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake 
County. 702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah 1985); National Parks and 
Conservation Assoc, v. Board of State Lands. 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 
23 (Utah 1993). 
Some of the same factors pertinent to the injury analysis are 
also relevant in determining the weightiness of the issues 
presented in this litigation. Certainly competition in any market 
is of immense public importance. Nevertheless, judicial 
micromanagement of competition in an already extensively regulated 
industry, such as financial institutions, is not an item high on 
any list of public interest. As indicated above, even if the 
Bankers Association were to prevail on the merits, substantial 
multicounty competition with credit unions could lawfully occur as 
a result of merger and otherwise. As a consequence, the public 
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interest in judicial intervention in credit union intercounty 
activities is de minimis. Moreover, the real competitive irritant 
to the Bankers Association appears to be the differing tax 
treatment afforded credit unions, a question patently more 
appropriate for the legislative and executive branches than for the 
judiciary. 
The court does not doubt the genuineness of the Bankers 
Association position that its members are competitively injured by 
the Commissioner's alleged failure to enforce the statutory limited 
field of membership provisions. The court, however, doubts the 
public significance of such alleged injury when faced with the 
undisputed fact that no bank has previously raised the issue in any 
court in the decade since the Department's adherence to the 
September, 1983 Kwant Memorandum. 
If the court were to grant the relief initially requested by 
the Bankers Association, it would be forced to oversee the 
divestiture of the multicounty operations of many credit unions, a 
function foreign to the judiciary. If the court were to effectuate 
plaintiff's alternative remedy of grandparenting all existing 
credit union operations, it would be creating a whole new industry 
for the executive branch to regulate by establishing distinct 
categories of credit unions with a variety of geographic 
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privileges, i.e., those limited to single county operations, those 
limited to operations in multiple counties but which are fewer than 
all Utah counties, and those whose field of membership is 
unlimited in Utah. Furthermore, the court would become enmeshed in 
administering the new regulatory framework by resolving such 
questions as whether a credit union would be allowed to solicit new 
members or expand operations in those counties where it already had 
a presence. A regulatory morass could well be the result. 
The issues raised by the Bankers Association are not of such 
public moment that it should be allowed to invoke the power of this 
court, which is reserved for few unique circumstances. The failure 
of banks over the last decade to raise the issues they now present 
would cause the judiciary to become enmeshed in regulatory matters 
more appropriate for the executive branch. Finally, the issues of 
competition within the financial institution industry appear to be 
affected more by tax laws than by the multicounty operations of 
credit unions. Promulgation of tax laws is quite obviously 
inherent in the legislative branch. As a consequence, even if the 
issues raised by the Bankers Association were of significant public 
importance, they are more appropriate for resolution by the 
legislative and executive branches and standing before the courts 
should be denied. Id. 
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IV. LACHES AND ESTOPPEL 
Even if the Bankers Association had standing to pursue this 
litigation, the doctrines of laches and estoppel would apply and 
preclude injunctive relief as a result of the failure of any bank 
or the Bankers Association to present these issues to any court in 
the decade since the promulgation of the Kwant Memorandum.5 The 
Bankers Association's suggestion of only a prospective remedy, 
overlooking alleged past transgressions of a single county rule, 
would actually create prejudice to those credit unions which quite 
fortuitously lagged, behind their institutional colleagues in 
developing multicounty membership and operations. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of standing might disparagingly be perceived as 
a mere vehicle for a court to duck tough issues. In this 
particular case, however, the doctrine appropriately discharges its 
gatekeeping function which enables courts to deflect issues which 
are more appropriately resolved by another branch of government. 
The underlying and real dispute in this case is the disparate tax 
treatment of banks and credit unions which is a matter for the 
5
 The laches and estoppel defenses are not necessarily 
applicable to plaintiff's claims concerning the Service Center. 
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legislature. As a consequence, the entirety of this litigation 
involving differences between credit unions and banks is more 
appropriately resolved by the executive or legislative branches, 
not the judiciary. 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motions for summary 
judgment are granted. Defendants are to submit an appropriate form 
of judgment pursuant to Rule 4-504, Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Dated this /7 day of March, 1994. 
MICHAEI/RC MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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